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 [W]e are in the never-never land of the
 Immigration and Nationality Act, where plain
 words do not always mean what they say.'
 INTRODUCTION
 The 1980's witnessed a resurgence of interest in immigration law, especially
 in the role played by constitutional principles. Much of this interest is attribut-
 able to events that tested the limits of immigration law in unprecedented ways.
 The influx of Cubans in the Mariel boatlift and the large number of Haitians
 fleeing the Duvalier regime were the most prominent, but civil strife and
 economic conditions throughout the world further swelled the numbers of
 would-be immigrants. The result was an increased and often chaotic demand
 for a commodity in very short supply-lawful admission to the United States.
 And when the federal government tried to enforce the immigration laws in this
 setting, long and complicated litigation was the predictable result. These events
 forced courts to search for new answers to the fundamental questions that
 immigration law poses-who are "we" as a community, and what do we
 demand of those who want to join?
 The most prominent case arising out of these developments is Jean v.
 Nelson,2 a 1985 decision of the United States Supreme Court that captures
 much of what is significant about the immigration law cases of the past decade.
 Jean involved the influx of Haitians into south Florida during the early 1980's,
 most of whom sought political asylum. The United States government adopted
 1. Yuen Sang Low v. Attorney Gen., 479 F.2d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 1973).
 2. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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 a general practice of detaining these Haitians pending a decision on their
 asylum claims, and did not grant their requests to be released temporarily on
 "parole."3 The plaintiffs in Jean alleged that this detention policy denied equal
 protection because it discriminated on the basis of national origin and race
 against these Haitians, almost all of whom were Black. The case eventually
 reached the Supreme Court.
 As I use the term, "immigration law" refers to the body of law governing
 the admission and expulsion of aliens.4 It should be distinguished from the
 more general law of aliens' rights and obligations, which includes, for example,
 their tax status, military obligations, and eligibility for government benefits and
 certain types of employment.' Jean could have been the occasion for the Court
 to confront squarely the "plenary power doctrine." This doctrine has dominated
 immigration law since the Court adopted it almost one hundred years ago in
 rejecting constitutional objections to Congress' first immigration statutes. The
 plenary power doctrine's contours have changed over the years, but in general
 the doctrine declares that Congress and the executive branch have broad and
 often exclusive authority over immigration decisions. Accordingly, courts
 should only rarely, if ever, and in limited fashion, entertain constitutional
 challenges to decisions about which aliens should be admitted or expelled.
 By the time Jean reached the Supreme Court, the doctrine had long been
 under heavy fire from many quarters. Critics expressed deep concern over the
 continuing isolation of an entire body of law from the mainstream of American
 public law-isolation not only from the process of constitutional judicial
 review, but also from the constitutional norms and principles developed through
 that process over the years.6 Even though the Court had endorsed some version
 of the plenary power doctrine in cases decided in the 1970's,7 a number of
 observers had predicted the gradual demise of the doctrine and a corresponding
 reintegration of our usual expectations regarding judicial review into immigra-
 tion law.8
 The Jean decision, however, was anticlimactic because the majority did not
 reach the constitutional issue. Instead, it found that any discrimination against
 the Haitians based on race or national origin would be unlawful as contrary to
 the statute and the government's regulations. Many knowledgeable observers
 3. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, ? 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. ? 1182(d)(5) (1988) [hereinafter
 INA]; 47 Fed. Reg. 30,044 (1982) (as amended at 47 Fed. Reg. 46,493 (1982)) (amending 8 C.F.R.
 ?? 212.5, 235.3).
 4. The term "alien" is standard usage, but I use it advisedly because of the word's distancing effect
 and somewhat pejorative connotation. I also admit to some hypersensitivity on this point as a former "alien"
 myself.
 5. This definition of "immigration law" is common to the literature. See, e.g., Legomsky, Immigration
 Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 256.
 6. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1984) (immigration law
 isolated from other legal areas).
 7. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
 8. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 5; Schuck, supra note 6.
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 saw Jean as a potential landmark decision that never was. Understandably,
 those observers had focused on the plenary power doctrine's substance-its
 denial to aliens of an opportunity to vindicate constitutional claims in immigra-
 tion cases. I believe, however, that this focus on the most obvious consequence
 of plenary power has obscured its subtle, more fundamental effects on the
 process of growth and change in this field of law.
 The broader subject suggested by Jean-but one never before explored in
 any depth-is the relationship between constitutional and subconstitutional
 immigration law. As I use the term here, "constitutional immigration law"
 means the application of constitutional norms and principles to test the validity
 of immigration rules in subconstitutional form, including statutes, regulations,
 and administrative guidelines. In contrast, "subconstitutional immigration law"
 means the interpretation and application of those statutes, regulations, adminis-
 trative guidelines, and the like. Several commentators have noted that aliens
 tend to receive more favorable treatment when judges render subconstitutional
 decisions than when they render constitutional ones, but these observations have
 been made almost in passing, with little explanation or detail.9 This Article will
 attempt to provide the missing analysis.
 I begin with a point that was central to Justice Marshall's dissent in Jean:
 nothing in the parole statute or regulations expressly prohibited the government
 from considering race or national origin in its parole decisions.10 He is correct
 about the language of the statute and regulations." Also correct is his more
 general point that parole is one of many immigration matters committed by
 statute to the broad discretion of the Attorney General.'2 What, then, prohibits
 the government from considering race or national origin when regulating the
 conduct of aliens? If this prohibition has a constitutional source, then was Jean
 a constitutional decision even though the Court purported to rule exclusively
 on statutory grounds? And if Jean was really a constitutional decision that
 implicitly upheld an equal protection claim, to what extent did this decision
 limit plenary power?
 My ultimate purpose is to examine immigration law for what it tells us
 about a general problem of legal process-the relationship, usually symbiotic,
 between statutory interpretation and constitutional law. The usual pattern in our
 law, most observers would agree, is that constitutional norms manifest them-
 selves in two principal ways. First, they govern expressly constitutional deci-
 9. See S. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATI()N AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA
 233-35, 239-41, 252-53, 259, 300 (1987); D. MARTIN, MAJOR ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION LAW 19, 25-27
 (1987); Anker, Jean v. Nelson: Neutral Principles in the Supreme Court Without the Constitution, 8 IMMIOR.
 J. 9 (1985). I am indebted to these commentators, whose observations on the relationship between constitu-
 tional and subconstitutional immigration cases first raised in my mind the questions that this Article tries
 to answer.
 10. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 858-68 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
 11. The governing regulation at that time was 8 C.F.R. ? 212.5 (1982).
 12. See 472 U.S. at 862-64.
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 sions; this is the intuitive definition of "constitutional." Second, in a less
 intuitive but equally correct use of the term, "constitutional" norms provide the
 background context that informs our interpretation of statutes and other sub-
 constitutional texts. This second use of constitutional norms explains and
 reflects the time-honored canon that courts ought to interpret statutes so as to
 avoid constitutional doubts.
 Immigration law, as it has developed over the past one hundred years under
 the domination of the plenary power doctrine, represents an aberrational form
 of the typical relationship between statutory interpretation and constitutional
 law. The aberrant quality is attributable to the prolonged nature of the contra-
 diction between these two sets of "constitutional" norms in immigration law.
 The constitutional norms that courts use when they directly decide constitutional
 issues in immigration cases are not the same constitutional norms that inform
 interpretation of immigration statutes. To serve the latter function, many courts
 have relied on what I call "phantom constitutional norms,""3 which are not
 indigenous to immigration law but come from mainstream public law instead.
 The result has been to undermine the plenary power doctrine through statutory
 interpretation.
 In my view, any fair assessment of phantom norm decisionmaking should
 reflect deep ambivalence. On the one hand, it has been an understandable and
 perhaps even noble response to the shortcomings of the plenary power doctrine,
 and for that reason I do not intend the term "phantom" pejoratively. More
 generally, the use of phantom norms during a transitional phase may be a
 healthy form of constitutional change. On the other hand, statutory interpreta-
 tion confuses and contorts the law when the interpreting court relies for an
 extended period on constitutional norms that are doctrinally "improper" in the
 sense that they do not control in cases which explicitly involve interpreting the
 Constitution. I suggest that the only way out of the dilemma posed by the
 prolonged reign of phantom norm decisionmaking in immigration law is to
 bring the transitional phase to an end-in short, to undertake a direct and
 candid reassessment of plenary power as constitutional doctrine.
 In addition to the light that I hope to shed on the relationship between
 statutory interpretation and constitutional law generally, I also will try to answer
 a more specific operational question, probably the most important one in
 immigration law today-what is left of the plenary power doctrine? A widely
 accepted view, with which I generally agree, is that the doctrine is in some state
 of decline. Yet the apparent conflicts and contradictions among the cases, and
 sometimes their open ambivalence, have frustrated the efforts of courts and
 commentators to be more precise about the doctrine's current vitality. I will
 suggest that the gradual demise of the plenary power doctrine is best understood
 as a function of the tension in immigration cases between constitutional doctrine
 13. I am grateful to Alex Aleinikoff for suggesting the term "phantom norm."
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 and statutory interpretation. The fact that the subconstitutional cases play such
 a central role in understanding plenary power means, in turn, that the doctrine's
 current vitality is the most important question not only in constitutional immi-
 gration law, but in immigration law as a whole. In short, this Article endeavors
 to provide a coherent theoretical and practical framework for all of immigration
 law, both constitutional and subconstitutional.
 The discussion proceeds in four stages. Part I explains the advent and
 persistence of the plenary power doctrine as the dominant principle of constitu-
 tional and subconstitutional immigration law. Part II discusses the emergence
 of phantom norm decisions in the 1950's and 1960's. Part III analyzes more
 recent phantom norm decisions-most prominently Jean v. Nelson, but also
 similar cases in the lower courts. Part IV examines more closely the problems
 that arise when courts choose phantom constitutional norms to guide their
 interpretation of statutes.
 I. PLENARY POWER AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 A. Classical Immigration Law
 The story of the plenary power doctrine's role in constitutional immigration
 law begins with the Supreme Court's 1889 decision in the Chinese Exclusion
 Case."4 Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese laborer, came to the United States in 1875,
 in a period when the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 seemed to guarantee unrest-
 ricted immigration from China. The United States had negotiated the treaty
 when it was interested in obtaining cheap Chinese labor and improving trade
 with China.15 But soon afterwards, racist and nativist anti-Chinese sentiment
 became widespread in California, and gradually gained influence on the national
 political scene.
 In 1880, the two countries negotiated a supplemental treaty that allowed the
 United States to "regulate, limit or suspend" immigration of Chinese labor-
 ers.16 Those already here in November 1880 could continue "to go and come
 of their own free will and accord." 17 In 1882, Congress suspended immigration
 of Chinese laborers for ten years. Those here who wished to leave and return
 could obtain certificates to show that they had come before November 1880,
 14. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
 15. Justice Field's opinion gives a contemporary account of Chinese immigration to the United States.
 Id. at 590-98; see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 715-19 (1893). For more historical
 background, see T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 1-5 (1985); R. TAKAKI,
 STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHoRE 79-131 (1989).
 16. The treaty authorized the United States to "regulate, limit or suspend" immigration of Chinese
 laborers whenever their entry or residence in the United States "affects or threatens to affect the interests
 of that country, or to endanger the good order of [the United States] or of any locality within the territory
 thereof." 130 U.S. at 596 (citing treaty). The United States could not "absolutely prohibit" immigration,
 and its power to suspend was limited to Chinese laborers. Id.
 17. Id.
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 and in 1884 these certificates became necessary for reentry."8 Chae Chan Ping
 obtained a certificate in 1887 and returned to his native China. The next year,
 while he was overseas, Congress barred the return of Chinese laborers, even
 those with certificates. Held on a ship in San Francisco Bay, Chae Chan Ping
 asserted two challenges to the 1888 statute in a petition for habeas corpus. His
 first argument was that the statute violated the 1880 treaty provision that
 Chinese laborers already here could leave and return. Justice Field acknowl-
 edged that the statute and treaty conflicted, but found that they were on an
 equal footing, and thus that the statute, being later in time, prevailed.
 The second issue in the Chinese Exclusion Case was whether, as a constitu-
 tional matter, the 1888 statute was "beyond the competency of Congress to pass
 it."19 Here the Court had its first chance to consider directly the federal
 government's power to exclude aliens,20 which the Constitution does not
 address explicitly.21 In setting out what was to become the conceptual frame-
 work for classical immigration law, the Court's concern was the federal govern-
 ment's power under the Constitution;22 it did not consider whether the rights
 of an individual alien might somehow limit Congress' immigration power. We
 must bear in mind that this was an earlier era of constitutional law, when equal
 protection was well on its way to "separate but equal," and judicial recognition
 of the substantive and procedural rights of individuals was still far beyond the
 constitutional horizon.
 Justice Field's opinion established that the federal government has the
 power to regulate immigration, and it further suggested that the political
 branches could exercise this power without being subject to judicial review.23
 He wrote that Congress' power to regulate immigration was based on national
 18. Id. at 598-99.
 19. Id. at 603.
 20. Cf. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (upholding federal tax on vessel owners of 50? for
 each alien brought into United States); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (invalidating
 state taxes on immigrants).
 21. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 8, cI. 4 (power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization").
 22. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604 ("While under our Constitution and form of government the great
 mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their relation to foreign countries
 and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations,
 the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security
 throughout its entire territory.").
 23. Some of the most often quoted language from the many cases that express this view is from
 Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909), which held constitutional a levy on
 carriers who had brought inadmissible aliens to the United States "[Olver no conceivable subject is the
 legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over [the admission of aliens]." Id. at 339, quoted
 with approval, Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972);
 see also Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334-35 (1932); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 40
 (1924); Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 88 (1914); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913); Keller
 v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1909); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 289-
 92 (1904); Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 302 (1902); Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S.
 486, 495 (1901); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 699-701 (1898); cf. United States v. Ju
 Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905) (applicant for admission has no right to de novo judicial review of his claim
 of citizenship); Lee Lung v. Patterson, 186 U.S. 168, 175-77 (1902) (upholding refusal to admit wife and
 daughter of returning resident of Chinese descent).
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 security, sovereignty over its own territory, and self-preservation.'- "[If Con-
 gress] considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country,
 who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security . . .
 its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary."25 Justice Field also charac-
 terized the Chinese laborers' right to return as a license, revocable by the
 United States government.26 Suggesting that immigration cases might be
 nonjusticiable as political questions, Field wrote that any remedy for the
 aggrieved alien must be sought on the alien's behalf by the Chinese government
 from the political branches of the United States government.
 Two years later, in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,28 the Court expanded
 the notion of plenary power in two significant ways. First, it rejected a chal-
 lenge based on a claim of individual constitutional right. An administrative
 officer had found that a Japanese immigrant was likely to become a public
 charge, which in turn made her excludable under the statute. She argued that
 due process required a judicial proceeding. As in the Chinese Exclusion Case,
 the Court relied on maxims of international law and sovereignty29 to conclude
 that the immigration power belonged to the federal government and to the
 political branches, and thus was exempt from judicial review.30 Nishimura also
 broadened plenary power in a second way. While the Chinese Exclusion Case
 had upheld Congress' substantive admission and exclusion rules, Nishimura
 applied plenary power to Congress' procedures for enforcing immigration laws,
 including procedures that entrusted final decisionmaking power to agency
 officials.31
 24. 130 U.S. at 604 ("'Any restriction upon [the power to exclude aliens], deriving validity from an
 external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an
 investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction."'
 (quoting The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, H1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812))); see also id. at 608
 ("The power [to exclude paupers, criminals and persons afflicted with incurable diseases] is constantly
 exercised; its existence is involved in the right of self-preservation.").
 25. 130 U.S. at 606.
 26. Id. at 609.
 27. Id. at 606 ("If the government of the country of which the foreigners excluded are subjects is
 dissatisfied with this action it can make complaint to the executive head of our government, or resort to
 any other measure which, in its judgment, its interests or dignity may demand; and there lies its only
 remedy."); see also id. at 609 ("If there be any just ground of complaint on the part of China, it must be
 made to the political department of our government, which is alone competent to act upon the subject.").
 28. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
 29. Id. at 659 ("It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power,
 as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
 dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.").
 30. Id. (Power over admission and exclusion "belongs to the political department.").
 31. Id. at 660 ("[T]he final determination of those facts [establishing an alien's right to land] may be
 entrusted by Congress to executive officers; and in such a case, as in all others, in which a statute gives
 a discretionary power to an officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, he is made
 the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly
 authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to reexamine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which
 he acted"); see also Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 541-47 (1895) (following Nishimura
 Ekiu).
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 In Fong Yue Ting v. United StateS,32 decided in 1893, the Court further
 extended plenary power to the deportation of resident aliens already in the
 United States. An 1892 statute had extended the ban on Chinese immigration
 for ten years. Those already resident when the ban took effect were allowed
 to stay, but only if they could prove pre-1892 residency through a white
 witness.33 Fong and two other Chinese laborers claimed pre-1892 residency,
 but could not produce white witnesses. Justice Gray's majority opinion rejected
 Fong's constitutional challenge, based on procedural due process, to the white
 witness rule. Gray declined to distinguish between the power to deport and the
 power to exclude,34 dismissing the idea that deportation should trigger the
 more substantial constitutional safeguards associated with "punishment."35
 Relying on the Chinese Exclusion Case and Nishimura Ekiu, he concluded that
 the political branches could regulate immigration, immune from judicial review
 unless provided for by Congress.36
 The three dissenters in Fong advanced arguments that would prove influen-
 tial in later attempts to limit the plenary power doctrine. Justice Brewer argued
 that deportation should prompt greater concern than exclusion because constitu-
 tional protections apply within United States territory even if they do not apply
 outside it.37 All three dissenters suggested that resident aliens have ties to the
 United States that justify greater legal protection,38 and that Fong's constitu-
 tional challenge merited judicial attention because the "credible white witness"
 rule violated procedural due process.39 Justices Brewer and Fuller took the
 position that deportation was "punishment" to which constitutional safeguards
 32. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
 33. Under the statute, residency was to be proved by a certificate, which under the regulations required
 the "affidavit of at least one credible witness." See id. at 701 n. 1 (citing statute and regulations). The statute
 allowed for deportation of those without certificates unless they showed good cause for not obtaining one
 and proved pre-1892 residency through a "white" witness. Id. at 700 n.l.
 34. Id. at 713 ("The power to exclude aliens and the power to expel them rest upon one foundation,
 are derived from one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are in truth but parts of one and the
 same power.").
 35. Id. at 730 ('The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment, in the
 sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punish-
 ment. It is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with
 the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional
 authority and through the proper departments, has determined that his continuing to reside here shall
 depend.") (distinguishing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), as concerning "the power of a State
 over aliens continuing to reside within its jurisdiction, not of the power of the United States to put an end
 to their residence in the country").
 36. 149 at 715. See also id. at 706 ("conclusive upon the [Jiudiciary"); id. at 711 ("The United States
 are a sovereign and independent nation, and are vested by the Constitution with the entire control of
 international relations, and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control and to make
 it effective.").
 37. Id. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
 38. Id. at 734-37 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 746 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 762 (Fuller, J.,
 dissenting).
 39. Id. at 741-42 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 754 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 762-63 (Fuller, J.,
 dissenting). Justice Gray's majority opinion characterized the "credible white witness" rule as a mere rule
 of evidence. Id. at 729-30.
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 should apply.40 Interestingly, Fong and the dissenters all seemed to assume
 that Congress' decision to single out Chinese aliens was not open to chal-
 lenge.41
 The first sign that the Fong dissents would be influential came in a 1903
 decision, Yamataya v. Fisher,42 also known as the Japanese Immigrant Case.
 The government arrested and tried to deport Yamataya four days after she had
 landed in the United States. Although the Court did not question the validity
 of the plenary power doctrine in general,43 in refusing to allow deportation
 it relied on two of the grounds suggested by the Fong dissenters. According
 to the Court, aliens inside the United States can invoke more constitutional
 safeguards than aliens seeking admission, and courts reviewing deportation
 orders should examine procedural due process questions more closely than they
 should examine substantive immigration rules."
 These four cases established a classical immigration law45 with two signifi-
 cant dimensions-the alien's location and the nature of the constitutional
 challenge to an adverse immigration decision. The Chinese Exclusion Case and
 Nishimura Ekiu suggested that no constitutional objection by an alien outside
 the United States would be successful. All of the Fong Yue Ting opinions
 assumed that an alien in the United States who challenged substantive deporta-
 tion rules would likewise be unsuccessful. Finally, Yamataya suggested that an
 alien in the United States who objected to deportation procedures might have
 some success.
 B. Plenary Power in the Early Modern Era
 As Peter Schuck has pointed out, the plenary power cases of classical
 immigration law reflect an emphasis on territoriality that was consistent with
 the sovereignty and consent-based legal culture of the nineteenth century.46
 It is noteworthy, if not striking, that the doctrine, a product of the same era as
 40. Id. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 763 (Fuller, J., dissenting). See generally Schuck, supra
 note 6, at 66-68.
 41. The Court upheld the constitutionality of substantive discrimination against specified classes of
 aliens in Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476, 480 (1893). See also United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams,
 194 U.S. 279, 294 (1904) (deportation of anarchist withstands First Amendment challenge).
 42. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
 43. Id. at 97-98.
 44. Id. at 101 ("[I1t is not competent for . . . any executive officer . . . arbitrarily to cause an alien,
 who has entered the country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its
 population, although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported without giving him
 all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States.").
 45. I borrow this term from Schuck, supra note 6.
 46. See id. at 7-8. On the historical and theoretical bases of the plenary power doctrine, see S.
 LEGOMSKY, supra note 9, at 177-222; Legomsky, supra note 5, at 260-78; Note, Constitutional Limits on
 the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (1982). Cf. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The
 Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 59-83 (1989) (criticizing
 "fiction of sovereignty").
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 Plessy v. Ferguson,47 has faded so little with the passage of time. A number
 of decisions in the first half of this century might be read as ameliorating the
 doctrine's harshest aspects, especially by building on Yamataya's apparent
 requirement of some procedural due process in deportation.48 Yet the Supreme
 Court reinvigorated the doctrine in a series of cases decided in the McCarthy
 Era, three of which are particularly important.
 The first, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,49 involved Ellen
 Knauff, who fled her native Germany after the Nazi seizure of power and
 served in Great Britain's Royal Air Force during World War II. She worked
 with the Allied occupation forces in Germany after the war, and in 1948 she
 married a United States citizen. Later that year she sought to enter the United
 States to be naturalized. The government, without a hearing, ordered her
 permanently excluded on the ground that her admission would be prejudicial
 to the interests of the United States. Not knowing what had prompted this order,
 she challenged it by seeking a writ of habeas corpus; the lower courts rejected
 her petition. Over vigorous dissent, the Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion
 order in language reminiscent of the nineteenth-century cases. The Court held
 that the power to exclude aliens, even the wife of a citizen, is fundamental to
 sovereignty. Unless Congress provides otherwise, that power is beyond judicial
 review, especially during national emergency, and it includes procedure as well
 47. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
 48. Deportation cases to this effect include United States ex ret. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigra-
 tion, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927) ("Deportation without a fair hearing or on charges unsupported by any
 evidence is a denial of due process."); United States ex ret. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133 (1924) (similar);
 Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 300 (1914) (similar); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912) (deporta-
 tion based on agency factfinding "after a fair though summary hearing, may constitutionally be made
 conclusive"); Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 468 (1912) (similar); cf. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
 U.S. 276, 281-85 (1922) (due process requires judicial proceeding before person claiming to be citizen, and
 presenting evidence to that effect, can be deported).
 Similar exclusion cases all involved claims of United States citizenship. For example, Kwock Jan Fat
 v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920), held that an administrative decision to exclude a returning resident of
 Chinese descent, who claimed United States citizenship, was final and conclusive upon United States courts
 unless such a finding were
 "manifestly unfair," were "such as to prevent a fair investigation," or show "manifest abuse" of the
 discretion committed to the executive officers by the statute, Low Wah Suey, [225 U.S. 460, 468
 (1912)], or that "their authority was not fairly exercised, that is, consistently with the fundamental
 principles of justice embraced within the conception of due process of law." Tang Tun v. Edsell, [223
 U.S. 673, 681-81 (1912)]. The decision must be after a hearing in good faith, however summary, Chin
 Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 12 (1908), and it must find adequate support in the evidence.
 Id. at 457-58; see also Tang Tun, 223 U.S. at 675-82 (constitutional to refuse admission after "careful and
 fair" administrative hearing to returning resident of Chinese descent who claimed United States citizenship);
 Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 12 (1908) ("The decision of the Department is final, but that is
 on the presupposition that the decision was after a hearing in good faith, however summary in form."); cf.
 Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 335-36 (1932) (fine imposed on steamship company for
 transporting aliens found inadmissible is valid if procedure "satisfies elementary standards of fairness and
 reasonableness"). See generally Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts:
 An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1390-91 (1953) (noting growth of a body of law
 qualifying the plenary power doctrine); Developments in the Law-Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV.
 L. REV. 643, 674-76 (1953) (similar).
 49. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
This content downloaded from 
             143.229.43.66 on Wed, 18 Nov 2020 16:25:59 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 556 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 100: 545
 as substance.50 The Court declared with a quiet, chilling brutality: "Whatever
 the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
 denied entry is concerned."'51
 The second case, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,52 involved
 a permanent resident who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years.
 In 1948, leaving his wife at home, Mezei traveled to Eastern Europe, apparently
 to visit his dying mother. While there, Mezei had trouble obtaining the neces-
 sary exit papers to embark on his journey back home. When he finally arrived
 on this country's shores, in possession of an immigration visa issued by the
 American Consul in Budapest, the government excluded him without a hearing,
 on the "basis of information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which
 would be prejudicial to the public interest."5S3 No other country would take
 Mezei, so the government confined him indefinitely on Ellis Island. He re-
 mained in custody for twenty-one months before a district court first granted
 a writ of habeas corpus ordering his release.
 One might have expected the law, in the form of either the immigration
 statute or constitutional immigration law, to treat a long-time permanent resident
 less harshly than it would treat a first-time entrant. But with respect to the
 statute, any such hopes were unfounded. The Immigration and Nationality Act
 (INA) and its predecessor statutes, like the constitutional immigration law of
 the classical period, have been structured to ask first if an alien is located inside
 or outside the country. The alien's location then determines which of two basic
 sets of rules apply-admission rules, which are tied to quotas and supplemented
 by exclusion rules, or deportation rules, which expel aliens who should not have
 been admitted or who have committed bad acts after admission.54
 50. Id. at 542-43 ("Whatever the rule may be concerning deportation of persons who have gained entry
 into the United States, it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to
 review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien.").
 51. Id. at 544. Eventually, the government revealed the adverse information at a full hearing, and the
 immigration judge still found her excludable. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) then reversed and
 admitted her. For more background, see E. KNAUFF, THE ELLEN KNAUFF STORY (1952).
 52. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
 53. Id. at 208. The government relied on the Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, ? 1, 55 Stat. 252 (currently
 codifed as amended at 8 U.S.C. ? 1225(c), INA ? 235(c), and 8 C.F.R. ? 175.57).
 54. Starting in 1875, immigration statutes began to exclude some aliens on the basis of national origin.
 Other statutes applied to all countries but excluded certain types of undesirables. See Act of Feb. 20, 1907,
 ch. 1134, ? 2, 34 Stat. 898, 898-99; Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, ? 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214; Act of Mar.
 3, 1891, ch. 551, ? 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084; Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, ? 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214 (lunatics,
 idiots, convicts, and those liable to become a public charge); Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, ? 5, 18 Stat.
 477, 477 (excluding prostitutes and convicts). In 1917, Congress enacted legislation that codified the existing
 categories of excludable aliens, excluded illiterates for the first time, and banned almost all Asian immigra-
 tion. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, ? 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-78.
 Alongside these exclusion statutes, Congress enacted the predecessors of today's deportation grounds.
 At first, these laws were limited to removing aliens who had entered in violation of the admission and
 exclusion statutes. Beginning in 1907, however, Congress provided for the deportation of aliens for acts
 committed after arrival. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, ? 3, 34 Stat. 898, 899-900. Cf. Act of June 25,
 1798, ch. 58, ? 1, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (President may order any alien whom he judged "dangerous to the peace
 and safety of the United States" to leave country without hearing); Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, ? 1, 1 Stat.
 577, 577 (President during war may apprehend, restrain, secure and remove all enemy aliens without
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 The key statutory question has always been whether an alien has "entered"
 the United States, which can occur through the government's decision to admit
 her or through a surreptitious border crossing."5 If an alien has not entered but
 seeks entry, the admission and exclusion rules apply; after entry, deportation
 rules apply."6 To be sure, "entry" could be defined to include only an alien's
 first entry, thus categorizing returning permanent residents as deportable rather
 than excludable. But the Court had unmistakably rejected this view long before
 Mezei by establishing the "reentry doctrine," which subjects returning perma-
 nent residents to exclusion grounds and procedures each time they return to this
 country from a trip, however brief.57 Congress largely incorporated the reentry
 hearing). See generally Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 761 (1972); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
 U.S. 580, 588 n.15 (1952); T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 348-49.
 Then, in 1924, the National Origins Act, our first comprehensive immigration statute, established a
 quota system that tied immigration from each foreign land to its share of the existing United States
 population. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, ? 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159-60. In addition, the National Origins Act
 limited European immigration to 150,000 annually. Id. ? 11. Without expressly mentioning Japan, it also
 barred Japanese immigration altogether by prohibiting the admission of any alien "ineligible to citizenship."
 Id. ? 13(c), a phrase clearly intended to apply to Japanese. See generally R. TAKAKI, supra note 15, at 208-
 10. In 1921, Congress had adopted the first quotas in a provisional measure that capped European immigra-
 tion and limited the number of immigrants of each nationality to three percent of their foreign-born
 countrymen resident in the United States as of the 1910 census. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, ? 2, 42 Stat.
 5, 5. The McCarren-Walter Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, consolidated previous immigra-
 tion laws, and per-country limits replaced the national origins quotas in 1965. Immigration and Nationality
 Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, ? 2, 79 Stat. 911, 911-12. Through all of these changes,
 the basic immigration statute has continued to rely on admission rules tied to quotas and supplemented by
 exclusion rules, and deportation rules for aliens who should not have been admitted or who have committed
 bad acts after admission.
 55. "Admission" is a term of art and does not include the granting of permission to enter the country
 on parole. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958). This article will not discuss the close
 questions that can arise when a surreptitious border crossing is claimed to constitute an "entry." See
 generally T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 315-23; id. at 25-26 (Supp. 1987).
 56. Generally, admission criteria are set forth in INA ?? 201-203, 8 U.S.C. ?? 1151-1153 (1988),
 exclusion grounds in INA ? 212, 8 U.S.C. ? 1182 (1988), and deportation grounds in INA ? 241, 8 U.S.C.
 ? 1251 (1988).
 57. The most prominent of these cases is United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
 Volpe entered the United States from Italy in 1906, when he was 16 years old. In 1925, he pleaded guilty
 to counterfeiting and was sentenced to prison. In 1928, he visited Cuba briefly, and two years later the
 government sought to deport him for having committed a crime of "moral turpitude" before entry. The
 deportation statute applied to "any alien who was convicted, or who admits the commission, prior to entry,
 of a felony or other crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, ? 19,
 39 Stat. 874, 889. Volpe was deportable only if his return from Cuba in 1928 had been an "entry," as the
 government urged. Otherwise, if he had last entered in 1906, the statute would not apply because the crime
 was not before entry. Another deportation ground, for a single crime within five years after entry, also would
 not apply because 19 years had passed. 289 U.S. at 426. A unanimous Court agreed with the government's
 reading of "entry" and upheld the deportation order. Id. at 425. See also United States ex ret. Stapf v. Corsi,
 287 U.S. 129, 132 (1932); United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401 (1929); Lewis v. Frick,
 233 U.S. 291, 297 (1914); Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 91 (1914); cf. Wani, supra note 46, at 89-96
 ("entry" fiction is primary determinant of procedural due process despite its "acknowledged falsity and
 outrageousness"). See also Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM.
 L. REV. 309, 327-29 (1956) (criticizing reentry doctrine for its "harsh consequences").
 On the facts of Volpe, this decision did not directly distinguish between exclusion and deportation;
 Volpe had entered the United States in 1928, making it too late to exclude him, so the government had to
 deport him if it was to act against him. The underlying logic of the decision, however, was that Volpe's
 22 years in the United States made no difference. If, for example, the government had stopped Volpe at
 the border upon his return from Cuba in 1928, he would have been "entering" at that time and thus subject
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 doctrine into the 1952 Immigration Act, when it defined "entry" to mean "any
 coming of an alien into the United States."58
 Because the reentry doctrine dashed Mezei's hopes for success on statutory
 grounds, the Court had to decide if the statute could constitutionally apply to
 a returning permanent resident the same exclusion rules that the statute would
 apply to a first-time entrant, including denial of a hearing. Relying on the
 plenary power doctrine and national security considerations, but once again over
 vigorous dissent, the Court said that the statute could deny Mezei both substan-
 tive rights and procedural safeguards available to deportable aliens.59 The
 Court characterized Mezei's constitutional position, like his position under the
 statute, as that of "an alien on the threshold of initial entry.""0 Mezei also
 sought to distinguish his case from Knauff by arguing that he, unlike Knauff,
 sought not just admission, but also release from indefinite detention. The Court
 rejected this argument as well, characterizing his incarceration as "temporary
 harborage, an act of legislative grace."6" Eventually, Mezei was paroled into
 the United States under a special clemency measure, but only after spending
 four years in detention.62
 The third case, the 1952 decision in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,63 involved
 substantive immigration categories, in contrast to the procedural claims in
 Knauff and Mezei. The Court upheld the deportations of Harisiades and two
 other resident aliens for having once belonged to the United States Communist
 Party, even though they were no longer members when that ground for deporta-
 tion became law.' While Knauff and Mezei had shown that an alien's location
 outside the United States would place him in a very precarious constitutional
 position, and Yamataya had established that location inside the United States
 to exclusion rather than deportation grounds and procedures.
 58. Pub. L. No. 82-414, Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, ? 101, 66 Stat. 163, 167 (emphasis added).
 The 1952 legislation put an end to arguments, see, e.g., T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 15, at
 326-27, that in reading "entry" to include a permanent resident's return, Volpe conflicted with the overall
 structure of the statutory exclusion and deportation grounds. The present definition of "entry" is set forth
 in INA ? 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. ? 1101(a)(13) (1988).
 59. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 210 ("Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a
 fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from
 judicial control.").
 60. Id. at 212 (distinguishing Yarnataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), discussed in Part I.A). See also
 id. at 213 ("For purposes of the immigration laws, moreover, the legal incidents of an alien's entry remain
 unaltered whether he has been here once before or not. He is an entering alien just the same, and may be
 excluded if unqualified for admission under existing immigration laws.").
 61. Id. at 215.
 62. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 n.36 (1957).
 63. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
 64. For years, Congress tried to deport aliens who were Communists or otherwise regarded as subver-
 sives. In 1939, the Supreme Court construed the deportation statute then in effect to allow the deportation
 of aliens who were members of organizations that advocated the overthrow of the government by force and
 violence, but not to allow deportation once membership had ceased. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939).
 In response, the Communist Party struck aliens from its membership rolls to spare them the risk of
 deportation. Congress in turn enacted a new statute that made aliens deportable if they had been members
 of the proscribed organizations at any time. See Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 670, ch. 439,
 ? 23, 54 Stat. 670, 673 (1940). The deportations in Harisiades were based on this second statute.
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 would enhance his ability to raise procedural constitutional challenges,
 Harisiades demonstrated that location inside the country would not necessarily
 facilitate substantive claims. The Court rejected arguments rooted in the Fifth
 Amendment due process clause that aliens, once admitted to permanent resi-
 dence, have a "vested right" to remain, or, alternatively, that any deportation
 grounds for permanent residents must be "reasonable."65 The Court's language
 suggested little if any judicial role: "[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and
 intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct
 of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form
 of government."66 According to the Court, "[s]uch matters are so exclusively
 entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from
 judicial inquiry or interference."67 The Court also rejected the argument that
 the First Amendment barred deportation, in reasoning that seemed to assume
 that the First Amendment did not protect the Communist Party membership of
 anyone, citizen or alien.68 Finally, the Court rejected the claim that Harisiades'
 deportation rested on an unconstitutional ex post facto law, reasoning that
 statute was not retroactive, and that even if it were, the constitutional prohibi-
 tion would not apply because deportation is a "civil" proceeding.69
 65. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 586-87 ("Under our law, the alien in several respects stands on an equal
 footing with citizens, but in others has never been conceded legal parity with the citizen. Most importantly,
 to protract this ambiguous status within the country is not his right but is a matter of permission and toler-
 ance. The Government's power to terminate its hospitality has been asserted and sustained by this Court
 since the question first arose.").
 66. Id. at 588-89.
 67. Id. at 589 (footnote omitted). Two years later, in Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529-32 (1954),
 the Court relied on Harisiades to uphold the constitutionality of the Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L.
 No. 81-831, ch. 1024, tit. I, ? 22, 64 Stat. 987, 1006 (1950) (substantially codified in NA ? 241(a)(6)(C),
 8 U.S.C. ? 1251(a)(6)(C) (1988)), which dispensed with the need under the Alien Registration Act of 1940
 to prove in each deportation that the Communist Party did "advocate the violent overthrow of the Govern-
 ment." Justice Frankfurter wrote "that the formulation of these [admission and expulsion] policies is
 entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissues
 of our body politic as any aspect of our government." 347 U.S. at 531. See also Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345,
 357 n.21 (1956) (constitutionality of statute permitting Attorney General to deny suspension of deportation
 to former Communist Party member on basis of undisclosed confidential information "gives us no difficul-
 ty"); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952) ("So long . . . as aliens fail to obtain and maintain
 citizenship by naturalization, they remain subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them under
 the sovereign right to determine what noncitizens shall be permitted to remain within our borders.") (footnote
 omitted).
 68. 342 U.S. at 591-93. The Court's reliance on Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), suggests
 that it made this assumption. Because First Amendment law has changed significantly since Harisiades,
 later cases might pose the question whether an alien can be deported for activity that would be constitution-
 ally protected for United States citizens. See generally T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 365-
 66. The court in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060, 1077-82 (C.D.
 Cal. 1989), reasoned that an alien's First Amendment challenge to a deportation ground must be analyzed
 just as if a citizen had raised it, and struck down certain ideological deportation grounds as unconstitutional.
 For a more detailed discussion of American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee see infra text accompany-
 ing notes 352-57.
 69. 342 U.S. at 593-95 (citing Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924), and Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228
 U.S. 585, 591 (1913)). See also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612-21 (1960); Lehmann v. United
 States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 689-90 (1957); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955); Galvan
 v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954).
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 Taken together, Knauff, Mezei, and Harisiades confirmed the modern
 importance of the two basic lines of inquiry in the early plenary power deci-
 sions: the alien's location and the type of constitutional challenge. Specifically,
 aliens "outside" the United States would continue to find it very difficult to
 raise any constitutional challenge to immigration decisions. Those "inside" the
 United States could have some success with procedural claims but would be
 likely to have none with substantive claims. At the same time, spirited dissents
 in all three cases expressed serious concern that aliens would be denied access
 to judicial review in such harsh and unremitting terms. In Mezei, the dissenters
 were particularly troubled by the majority's upholding as constitutional the
 statute's treatment of a returning permanent resident, effectively limiting
 Mezei's substantive and procedural rights to those of exclusion rather than
 deportation. In both Knauff and Mezei, the apparent disregard for even the most
 rudimentary procedural due process troubled the dissenters, just as it had been
 a primary focus of the Fong Yue Ting dissents, and of the Court's opinion in
 Yamataya.70 And in Harisiades, Justice Douglas, relying heavily on Justice
 Brewer's dissent in Fong Yue Ting,71 argued that resident aliens cannot be
 deported unless they are afforded constitutional protections, especially due
 process and equal protection.72 Gradually, the concerns expressed in the dis-
 sents in Mezei, Knauff, and Harisiades found sympathetic ears. The result has
 been an expansion in the number and range of claims that courts, including the
 Supreme Court, would hear in immigration cases.
 II. PHANTOM NORMS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION,
 AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
 A. Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation
 The principal decisions that have contributed to this expansion of judicial
 review in immigration cases have not been decisions of constitutional immigra-
 tion law. Instead, they reached results favorable to aliens by interpreting
 statutes, regulations, or other forms of subconstitutional immigration law. Of
 course, there is nothing remarkable about a court decision that relies on a
 subconstitutional rather than constitutional ground. A time-honored canon of
 70. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 224 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Procedural due process is more elemental
 and less flexible than substantive due process. It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and
 defers much less to legislative judgment."). See also Knauff, 338 U.S. at 552 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (ob-
 jecting to "a finding of serious misconduct against the wife of an American citizen without notice of charges,
 evidence of guilt and a chance to meet it"). In contrast, Jackson had written for the Harisiades majority
 in rejecting a substantive constitutional challenge. Sharp criticism of Knauff and Mezei was also expressed
 in Hart, supra note 48, at 1391-96 (Knauffs statement of complete acquiescence in procedure prescribed
 by Congress is "a patently preposterous proposition").
 71. For a discussion of Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), see supra text accompa-
 nying notes 32-41.
 72. 342 U.S. at 598 (Douglas, J., ctissenting).
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 statutory interpretation, often invoked by citing Justice Brandeis' 1936 concur-
 rence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,73 says that judges should
 interpret statutes to avoid constitutional doubt.74 While this canon is not un-
 controversial,75 and its predictive value is open to question,76 reliance on the
 canon, whether stated or unstated, seems to be a fact of everyday judicial life.
 The canon largely reflects the fact that constitutional norms usually manifest
 themselves in our law both directly and indirectly. First, constitutional norms
 may directly govern decisions that are expressly constitutional; this is the
 intuitive definition of "constitutional." In a less intuitive but equally correct use
 of the term "constitutional," these norms operate indirectly, by serving as the
 unstated background context that informs our interpretation of statutes and other
 subconstitutional texts. In other words, contemporary constitutional law is a
 significant element of the legal culture that judges inevitably, if often subcon-
 sciously, absorb and rely upon when acting in their judicial capacity, including
 those instances in which they engage in statutory interpretation.77
 73. 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
 74. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985); see also Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of
 Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2572-73 (1989); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
 Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-77 (1988); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980); NLRB v.
 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1979); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
 749 (1961). See generally W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRiCKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
 PUBLIC POLICY 676-89 (1988); Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007,
 1020-22 (1989). A closely related canon is the "rule of lenity" in criminal cases. See United States v.
 Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1971); Eskridge, supra, at 1029-30.
 75. Judge Posner, for example, objects that this practice allows courts to bend the meaning of statutes,
 thereby creating an inappropriate judge-made "'penumbra" around the Constitution. See R. POSNER, THE
 FEDERAL COURTS 285 (1985). See also United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2664 (1989) ("such
 'interpretive canon[s are] not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature"')
 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985)); Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of
 Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2580 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The fact that a particular application of
 the clear terms of a statute might be unconstitutional does not provide us with a justification for ignoring
 the plain meaning of the statute."); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 510-11 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
 dissenting) (to confine judiciary to its proper role, canon for construing statutes wherein constitutional ques-
 tions may lurk must be limited to constructions that are fairly possible); H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 210-12
 (1967); Posner, Statutory Interpretation-4n the Classroom & in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800,
 815-16 (1983).
 76. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064-65 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
 concurring) ("a sound general principle, but one often departed from when good reason exists.. . . I have
 not identified with certainty the first instance of our deciding a case on broader constitutional grounds than
 absolutely necessary, but it is assuredly no later than Marbury v. Madison ...."). See also Eskridge, supra
 note 74, at 1073 ("for every case like Catholic Bishop, which interprets statutes to avoid constitutional
 doubts, there are other cases where a statute is construed boldly, to face substantial constitutional troubles").
 77. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.
 321, 352 (1990) ("Because we always approach texts from the perspective of our own historically situated
 horizon, we tend to project our 'preunderstandings' onto the text, viewed as a whole. That is essential to
 interpretation, because the preunderstandings are conditioned by tradition and, hence, help us link our
 horizon with that of the text."); Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 106-07 (1989) ("The
 pragmatic judge would not necessarily spurn traditional legal authorities, like statutes or constitutional
 provisions, in part because such authorities may prove to be useful tools, and in part because they may in
 fact have given rise to practices and expectations which the pragmatic calculus must take into account.");
 Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 405, 411 (1989) (statutory
 interpretation relies on background principles drawn from context and, more generally, from legal culture);
 id. at 459 ("Interpretive principles are often a product of constitutional norms."); id. at 468 ("the Constitution
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 Bob Jones University v. United States78 illustrates how constitutional norms
 inform statutory interpretation. A nearly unanimous Court held that a nonprofit
 private school with racially discriminatory admissions standards did not qualify
 for a federal income tax exemption for institutions "organized and operated
 exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes."79 Reaching
 beyond the statutory text itself, the Court reasoned that the exemption was
 based on public services of value to society. It found that this purpose required
 denying the exemption to any organizations whose activities were "contrary to
 a fundamental public policy."80 Citing Brown v. Board of Education 81 the
 Court noted that "racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental
 national public policy, as well as rights of individuals."82 Even though the
 Congress that passed the original tax exemption statute probably did not
 contemplate future developments in the law against racial segregation, the
 Court's interpretation of the statute was intended to mirror standards of nondis-
 crimination embedded in the contemporary legal culture.83
 If Bob Jones illustrates how constitutional norms act as background norms
 when judges interpret statutes, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
 Defense Council, Inc.," a 1984 Supreme Court decision, illustrates how con-
 stitutional norms can perform an analogous function for statutory interpretation
 by administrative agencies. Chevron endorsed substantial deference to agency
 interpretation of statutes by holding that, absent discernible congressional intent,
 judges may decide only whether the agency's view is reasonable, not whether
 it is "appropriate."85 And when judges defer to agencies, they defer to inter-
 provides the backdrop against which statutes are written and interpreted, and it furnishes the basic assump-
 tions of interpretation"); White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV.
 415, 435 (1982) (interpreted text "must be fit together with other texts and with the rest of the culture to
 make what we call a field or body of law").
 78. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
 79. I.R.C. ? 501(c)(3) (1988).
 80. 461 U.S. at 592.
 81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
 82. 461 U.S. at 593.
 83. See generally Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1034-36 (public policy against racial segregation provided
 background context for interpreting statute in Bob Jones); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 77, at 343-44
 (similar). The same norm against racial discrimination also guided the Court's decision in Patterson v.
 McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), in which the Court declined to overrule its interpretation
 of 42 U.S.C. ? 1981 in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). See 109 S. Ct. at 2371 (referring to "our
 society's deep commitment to the eradication of discrimination based on a person's race or the color of his
 or her skin"); id. at 2380 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (similar); see also Jones
 v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); cf. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
 1, 17 (1981) (background norm based on notions of federalism: "[Ihf Congress intends to impose a condition
 on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. By insisting that Congress speak with a clear
 voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
 participation." (citation omitted)).
 84. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
 85. Id. at 842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
 as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
 determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
 impose its own construction on the statute ... as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
 interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
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 pretations that are very likely to reflect, even if at an unspoken level, the
 contemporary legal culture, which inevitably includes its constitutional law.86
 An outwardly different understanding of the canon-but one that is just the
 flip side of the view that constitutional norms serve as the background for
 subconstitutional interpretation-is to characterize its application as the
 "underenforcement" of constitutional norms for prudential reasons. Institutional
 constraints, especially the judiciary's sensitivity to its limited factfinding
 capability and attenuated electoral responsibility, make courts reluctant to issue
 a constitutional command to the political branches of government.87 Even if
 such a command clearly would reflect an established constitutional norm, courts
 can sometimes vindicate that norm less intrusively, and thus perhaps more
 justifiably, through the indirect route of statutory interpretation.88 Many such
 prudential considerations defy generalization, while others can be collected in
 bodies of doctrine-the political question89 and standing doctrines come to
 mind-that tend to limit judicial review.
 Indeed, the issue presented in Bob Jones could easily have arisen in litiga-
 tion in which the identity of the parties or the particular facts would prompt
 the Court to deny constitutional relief, perhaps based on standing or state action
 requirements.90 That these constitutional norms are real in spite of underen-
 forcement in some cases is apparent in the fact that these prudential concerns
 operate only interstitially. The Court in Bob Jones clearly took seriously the
 constitutional doubt that would have arisen if the Internal Revenue Code were
 for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." (footnotes
 omitted)); cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,446-48 (1987) (courts should not defer to agency inter-
 pretations on pure questions of law but only on mixed questions of law and fact).
 86. Cf. Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 20, 42-46 (1988) (Chevron's
 rule of substantial deference to agency interpretation provides major route for updating statutes because
 agency interpretations are likely to reflect current policy considerations more than they reflect original intent
 of legislature).
 87. See Sunstein, supra note 77, at 468 (courts reluctant to act with "vigor appropriate to governmental
 bodies with a better democratic and policymaking pedigree"); see also Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
 Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1214 (1978) ("important difference
 between a true constitutional conception and the judicially formulated construct is that the judicial construct
 may be truncated for reasons which are based not upon analysis of the constitutional concept but upon
 various concerns of the Court about its institutional role").
 88. This view addresses Judge Posner's objection to the judge-made "penumbra" around the Constitu-
 tion. See supra note 75.
 89. See Sager, supra note 87, at 1224 (political question doctrine rests on distinction "between a
 determination that there exist decisive reasons for the judiciary to decline to apply a norm of the Constitution
 to a given set of facts and a determination that the norm in question does not reach that set of facts").
 90. The Court noted that its reading of the statute eliminated any need to address arguments by many
 of the amici curiae that it would be unconstitutional for the government to read the Internal Revenue Code
 as the private schools had urged. 461 U.S. at 599 n.24. On the standing questions raised by those arguments,
 the Court found one year later, in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), that parents of Black children who
 were attending public schools undergoing desegregation in seven states lacked standing to sue the federal
 government to force it to)deny tax exemptions to racially segregated private schools that were created or
 expanded in their communities during that period.
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 interpreted to permit the tax exemption.9' Acceptance of the background
 constitutional norm of racial equality as part of mainstream public law is
 abundantly clear from other cases, among them Brown, in which the Court had
 to first invent and then apply such a constitutional norm explicitly for lack of
 any subconstitutional escape hatch.92
 B. The Emergence of Phantom Norm Decisionmaking in Immigration Law
 There is nothing wrong with borrowing constitutional norms to interpret
 statutes, but in choosing those norms courts must exercise care. I will try in
 the rest of Part I] and in Part III to review an array of immigration cases
 decided in the past fifty years to show that immigration law has come to
 represent an aberrational form of the typical relationship between constitutional
 and subconstitutional law exemplified by Bob Jones. In immigration law, the
 "constitutional" norms that actually inform statutory interpretation-which are
 norms borrowed from public norms generally-conflict with the expressly
 articulated constitutional norm-unreviewable plenary power. The former are
 "phantom" rather than "real" constitutional norms in the sense that they do not
 serve the first function of "constitutional" norms-namely, direct application
 to constitutional issues raised in immigration cases. In fact, the plenary power
 cases provide, as a matter of explicit constitutional theory, that the immigration
 context is different, and that therefore we cannot directly apply mainstream
 constitutional norms in immigration cases. But "phantom constitutional norms"
 are "constitutional" in the sense that they, having been at least seriously enter-
 tained as a constitutional argument and in many cases actually adopted as an
 expressly constitutional decision in other areas of law, then carry over to
 immigration cases, where they are substantial enough to serve the limited
 function of informing interpretation of immigration statutes and other subconsti-
 tutional texts. Or, to use an image from the physical sciences, they have enough
 gravitational force to exercise a pull on these other sources of law.93 In this
 context, phantom norms produce results that are much more sympathetic to
 aliens than the results that would follow from the interpretation of statutes in
 91. See 461 U.S. at 599 n.24 (citing two then-recent leading cases invoking this interpretive canon to
 avoid constitutional doubts: United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980), and NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,
 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979)).
 92. That this norm is "real" is also clear from cases holding that Congress may enforce these norms,
 even against private activity, under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or under Congress' power to
 provide for the "general Welfare," U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 8, cl. 1. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980). Similar reasoning underlies the
 interpretation given Title VII, 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e (1988), in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
 200-08 (1979). For a discussion of the use of background norms to interpret Title VII in Weber and Johnson
 v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627-42 (1987), which used similar reasoning to uphold affirmative
 action programs for women, see Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1033-34.
 93. See Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1018-19.
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 light of the expressly applicable constitutional immigration law based on
 plenary power.
 The emergence of these more sympathetic results is easier to understand
 if we look beyond the field of "immigration law," defined as the law of
 admission and expulsion of aliens. Once we expand our inquiry to include the
 more general law of aliens' rights and obligations, the force of the plenary
 power doctrine diminishes considerably. In contrast to the harshness of classical
 immigration law, a long line of Supreme Court decisions has afforded a mea-
 sure of protection to aliens that much more closely resembles the substantive
 and procedural rights of individuals in mainstream public law. By use of the
 term "mainstream," I do not mean to suggest that there is a set of transcendent
 constitutional norms "out there" that do not vary according to the type of case
 or the nature of the power that Congress is asserting. The Court clearly adopts
 constitutional norms with the highest degreee of sensitivity to substantive
 context. My point is a more limited one-namely, that in all of these other
 contexts involving aliens the Court has adopted approaches that, despite varia-
 tions among them, consistently conflict with the begrudging attitude toward
 aliens reflected in the plenary power doctrine.94
 A seminal case in this regard is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, decided by the Court
 in 1886, which held that the Constitution protects all individuals inside the
 United States, including aliens, from invidious discrimination at state hands.95
 The classification in question was not based on alienage per se, but rather was
 an ostensibly race-neutral regulation that was enforced so as to make it impossi-
 ble for aliens of Chinese descent to operate laundries in San Francisco. The
 basic point of Yick Wo-and one that stands in sharp contrast to the possible
 implications of the Chinese Exclusion Case-is that aliens, at least those
 lawfully present in the United States, are within the constitutional fold.96
 Another seminal case is Wong Wing v. United States,97 decided by the Court
 in 1896, which involved a statute providing that any Chinese national whom
 executive officials found to be in the United States illegally "shall be impris-
 oned at hard labor."98 The Court, only three years after the Chinese Exclusion
 Case, relied on Yick Wo in holding that an alien is entitled to the full range of
 protections afforded by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and specifically that
 94. I also do not intend to amalgamate artificially all other constitutional law into a unitary whole. Other
 areas of public law, among them federal Indian law and foreign affairs, to name only two, similarly stand
 outside the mainstream. But it is probably more accurate to say that those other areas are also isolated than
 it is to suggest that there is no such thing as "mainstream" constitutional law.
 95. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). The Supreme Court cited Yick Wo with approval in later cases. For
 example, in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950), the Court said that "[tihe alien, to whom
 the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of
 rights as he increases his identity with our society."
 96. See 118 U.S. at 369 ("The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the
 protection of citizens.").
 97. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
 98. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, ? 6, 27 Stat. 25.
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 "a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused" would be required before
 such "infamous punishment" could be imposed.99 Similarly, in the 1931 case,
 Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, the Court relied on Yick Wo and
 Wong Wing, among other cases, in applying the takings clause of the Fifth
 Amendment to benefit non-enemy aliens present within United States territo-
 ry. 10
 By the 1950's, aliens' rights decisions beyond the scope of immigration law
 already conflicted with assumptions implicit in the plenary power doctrine.101
 As Alex Aleinikoff has pointed out, the Yick Wo approach differs from classical
 immigration law's model of aliens' rights, which was a "membership model
 of citizenship and alienage" that responded to the perceived need to draw a line
 between those who belong to the "national community" and those who do
 not.102 The legacy of Yick Wo represents a different model based on "a notion
 of fundamental human rights that protects individuals regardless of their
 status."103 This model's emergence, as Peter Schuck has noted, is attributable
 to fundamental cultural changes fostering the growth of the values that he calls
 "communitarian."11 More specifically, the Yick Wo model draws sustenance
 from developments elsewhere in the constitutional law of individual rights and
 liberties, including the landmark 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
 tion.105
 These decisions, both in the law of aliens' rights and in the law of individu-
 al rights generally, have never fully coalesced into a coherent and comprehen-
 sive body of doctrine to guide courts' admission and expulsion decisions, and
 thus have never offered a fully textured alternative to the plenary power
 doctrine. Nor have they ever suggested that aliens be guaranteed the full range
 and force of constitutional protections enjoyed by citizens. But Yick Wo and
 its progeny took these constitutional claims seriously, in contrast to the cavalier
 treatment of constitutional claims in immigration law. Moreover, lawyers and
 judges, whether justified or not, have in fact relied on the values and the
 approach manifest in Yick Wo, and this reliance has influenced the course of
 99. 163 U.S. at 237.
 100. 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931).
 101. Yick Wo's more recent progeny are discussed infra text accompanying notes 194-217.
 102. See Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 9,
 10 (1990) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Membership] ("Immigration policy, conceived of as membership rules,
 is thought to lie at the core of national self-determination and self-definition."); see also Aleinikoff, Federal
 Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 864 (1989) [hereinafter Aleinikoff,
 Federal Regulation]; Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker
 Under United States Law, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 955, 967-77.
 103. Aleinikoff, Membership, supra note 102, at 19; see also Martin, Due Process and Membership
 in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PMrr. L. REv. 165, 180 (1983) ("[Alnyone
 inspired by the Yick Wo tradition-a certain pride in the broad reach of our Constitution's
 protections-cannot rest content with Knauff-Mezei nor with the pretense that excludable aliens really are
 not here.").
 104. See Schuck, supra note 6, at 34-53.
 105. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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 immigration law. For example, Wong Wing's application of constitutional
 protections to any "punishment" of an alien explains the persistence of the
 argument, first heard no later than Fong Yue Ting'06 and since then often
 reattempted in vain,'07 that deportation is punishment.108 In short, Yick Wo
 and its progeny, as well as other developments in the law of individual rights,
 have provided the normative foundation for results at odds with strict applica-
 tion of the plenary power doctrine.
 The centrality of phantom norm decisionmaking in immigration law gradual-
 ly emerged through several Supreme Court decisions from roughly the same
 period as Mezei, Knauff, and Harisiades. Their unifying characteristic is their
 propensity to use phantom norm constitutional reasoning to reach subconstitu-
 tional outcomes favorable to aliens. They differ from each other only in the
 boldness of their phantom norm decisionmaking.
 The earliest of these cases is Bridges v. Wixon,109 a 1945 decision that
 arose from the government's efforts to deport the union activist Harry Bridges.
 The pertinent deportation ground covered past membership or affiliation with
 "any organization, association, society, or group, that believes in, advises, advo-
 cates, or teaches . .. the overthrow by force of violence of the Government of
 the United States."110 The Court, reading the statute, held that Bridges was
 not subject to deportation.111 This was unremarkable; earlier decisions had
 relied on subconstitutional grounds to reach results favorable to aliens.112 One
 way to understand the case, however, is to focus on the potentially constitution-
 al character of the reasoning in Justice Douglas' majority opinion. That opinion
 106. As discussed supra text accompanying note 35, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
 (1893), distinguished Yick Wo in reaching this conclusion. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 725.
 107. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952) ("Deportation is not a criminal proceeding and
 has never been held to be punishment."); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924); United States ex rel.
 Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 154 (1923); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (Holmes,
 J.) (deportation is not "a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the Government to harbor persons whom it
 does not want").
 108. Aliens have also attempted to characterize deportation as punishment in order to challenge certain
 deportation grounds as unconstitutional ex post facto laws. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
 593-95 (1952), discussed supra text accompanying notes 63-69, and other sources cited supra note 69.
 109. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
 110. Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, ? 23, 54 Stat. 670, 671.
 111. The Court first interpreted "affiliation" narrowly, saying that the term required more than the mere
 sympathy or cooperation that the government had shown in Bridges. 326 U.S. at 143-44 ("Whether inter-
 mittent or repeated, the act or acts tending to prove 'affiliation' must be of that quality which indicates an
 adherence to or a furtherance of the purposes or objectives of the proscribed organization as distinguished
 from mere cooperation with it in lawful activities. The act or acts must evidence a working alliance to bring
 the program to fruition."). It then held that the finding of "membership" that triggered deportation had rested
 on unsworn statements that were inadmissible under the government's own regulations. Id. at 149-56.
 112. See, e.g., Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1915) (Commissioner of Immigration exceeded his
 statutory authority in basing "public charge" determination on local labor market only); Chin Yow v. United
 States, 208 U.S. 8, 12 (1908) (returning resident of Chinese descent not given adequate opportunity to prove
 United States citizenship: "If one alleging himself to be a citizen is not allowed a chance to establish his
 right in the mode provided by those statutes, although that mode is intended to be exclusive, the statutes
 cannot be taken to require him to be turned back without more.").
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 focused on deportation's harsh consequences,"3 an argument which lawyers
 and judges had previously used in asserting the constitutional claim that depor-
 tation should be treated like criminal punishment."4 Justice Murphy's concur-
 rence made clear this theme's constitutional dimensions by going further and
 relying on the same set of harsh consequences to declare that "[t]he unconstitu-
 tionality of the statute in issue and the invalidity of the proceeding brought
 pursuant thereto are obvious."115 Although the Court had consistently rejected
 that view as a constitutional matter,'16 it had sufficient gravitational force to
 affect the interpretation of the statute in Bridges.
 No single decision established the method of using statutory interpretation
 to offset the disadvantaged position of aliens in constitutional immigration law,
 but several cases taken together trace the development of a statutory-interpreta-
 tion pattern. The next key case in this progression is Fong Haw Tan v. Phe-
 lan.'17 In Fong Haw Tan, a 1948 decision, the Court was confronted with the
 issue of the proper construction of a statutory deportation ground. The statute
 in question provided for the deportation of any alien "sentenced [to imprison-
 ment] more than once" for committing crimes involving moral turpitude.118
 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas again focused on deportation's
 harsh consequences."9 Even though those consequences had never led a court
 to sustain a constitutional challenge to a substantive deportation ground, Justice
 Douglas declared, as a general interpretive rule, that courts must read ambigu-
 ous deportation statutes or regulations in the light most favorable to the
 alien.120
 113. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 147 ("[Ilt must be remembered that although deportation technically is not
 criminal punishment, it may nevertheless visit as great a hardship as the deprivation of the right to pursue
 a vocation or a calling" (citing, inter alia, Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922))); see also id.
 at 154 ("Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the
 individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation
 is a penalty-at times a most serious one-cannot be doubted.").
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 106-08.
 115. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 160 (Murphy, J., concurring).
 116. See supra text accompanying note 107.
 117. 333 U.S. 6, 7 (1948).
 118. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, ? 19(a), 39 Stat. 874, 889 (current version codified at 8 U.S.C.
 ? 155(a) (1988)).
 119. 333 U.S. at 10 ("We resolve the doubts in favor of that construction because deportation is a
 drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.... It is the forfeiture for misconduct
 of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty. To construe this statutory provision less gener-
 ously to the alien might find support in logic. But since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we
 will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the
 narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used." (citation omitted)).
 120. More recent applications of this rule include INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)
 (referring to "longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor
 of the alien"); INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964); Bonetti
 v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 699 (1958); Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1954). Similar canons of
 construction, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article, ameliorate the inequalities associated
 with treaties between the federal government and Indian tribes. See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
 FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221-25 (R. Strickland ed. 1982); D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN
 LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 214-17 (2d ed. 1986); C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE
 LAW 46-52 (1987); Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long As
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 In 1950, the Court decided Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath."2' At that time,
 the statute and regulations let the same corps of immigration inspectors investi-
 gate some deportation cases and preside over deportation proceedings in others.
 They could preside over cases in which they had performed prosecutorial tasks,
 though not over cases that they had investigated.122 The combination of adju-
 dicative and prosecutorial roles conflicted with the Administrative Procedure
 Act's separation-of-functions provisions,123 but the APA applied by its terms
 only to "adjudication required by statute."" Was a deportation hearing "re-
 quired by statute"? The Court said that it was, even though the statute contained
 no express requirement, reasoning that construing it otherwise "might again
 bring it into constitutional jeopardy." 125
 That holding126 belies Wong Yang Sung's complexity. Deportation with
 no hearing at all was almost certainly unconstitutional. This constitutional norm,
 having already been established in Yamataya v. Fisher, was not a phantom.127
 Another constitutional norm, however, also played a role in reaching the
 subconstitutional conclusion that the APA applied.128 This second norm, for-
 eign to immigration law, would have required as a constitutional due process
 matter, and contrary to the immigration statute without the APA, that the
 deportation proceedings be conducted by an independent hearing examiner who
 had not acted as a prosecutor. That this constitutional norm was a phantom
 finds confirmation five years later in Marcello v. Bonds,129 which rejected
 a due process challenge to similar separation-of-functions provisions in the 1952
 immigration statute.130
 Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 601 (1975);
 Note, The Canons of Indian Treaty and Statutory Construction: A Proposalfor Codification, 17 U. MICH.
 J. LEGAL RES. 681 (1984). For the view that these sympathetic canons may not always have an ameliorative
 effect, see Frickey, Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Federal Indian Law, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1208-09
 (1988).
 121. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
 122. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, ?? 16-17, 39 Stat. 874, 885-87, repealed by Immigration and
 Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, ? 403(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 279. The then-governing regulations are
 summarized in Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 45-46.
 123. Act of 1946, ch. 324, ?? 5(c), 11, 60 Stat. 237, 240, 244 (current version at 5 U.S.C. ?? 1004(c),
 1010).
 124. Act of 1946, ch. 324, ? 5, 60 Stat. 237, 240 (current version codified at 5 U.S.C. ? 1004).
 125. 339 U.S. at 50.
 126. See id. at 49 ("the difficulty with any argument premised on the proposition that the deportation
 statute does not require a hearing is that, without such hearing, there would be no constitutional authority
 for deportation"); id. at 49-50 ("It was under compulsion of the Constitution that this Court long ago held
 that an antecedent deportation statute must provide a hearing at least for aliens who had not entered
 clandestinely and who had been here some time even if illegally.") (citing Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S.
 86 (1903)).
 127. 189 U.S. 86 (1903), discussed supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
 128. See id. at 48-5 1.
 129. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
 130. Id. at 311 ("The contention is without substance when considered against the long-standing
 practice in deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous decisions in the federal courts, and
 against the special considerations applicable to deportation which the Congress may take into account in
 exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration matters."). Cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,
 46-55 (1975) (rejecting due process challenge against board of medical examiners); Richardson v. Perales,
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 In the end, Wong Yang Sung's interpretation of the APA reflects two
 constitutional norms, one "real"-deportation without a hearing violates proce-
 dural due process-and one "phantom" a deportation hearing before an
 official who mixes functions violates procedural due process. That case repre-
 sents a further step in the development of phantom norm decisionmaking
 because its language is bolder than that found in Bridges or in Fong Haw Tan.
 In those two earlier cases, the Court's decision had compensated only in very
 general fashion for the relatively disadvantageous position of aliens in immigra-
 tion law. Viewing only those two decisions, one could argue that they do not
 reflect phantom norms at all. They might simply be statutory interpretation
 cases that favor aliens, which we could explain without necessarily suggesting
 that they are the subconstitutional reflection of constitutional norms that the
 Court would not apply directly. But in Wong Yang Sung, the Court's constitu-
 tional reasoning, based in part on a phantom norm, was more specific to the
 question presented. This makes it harder to avoid characterizing the decision
 as a direct challenge to the result that the Court would have reached had it
 applied the "real" constitutional norm, which permitted combination of adjudi-
 cative, investigative, and prosecutorial functions.
 Phantom norm decisionmaking reached maturity in Kwong Hai Chew v.
 Colding,131 a 1953 case that the Supreme Court decided five weeks before
 Mezei, and which, like Mezei, concerned a returning permanent resident. After
 a five-month voyage as a seaman aboard a United States merchant ship, Chew
 sought to reenter the country. The government denied him entry, claiming it
 was "prejudicial to the public interest," and relying on the same enactments
 used to exclude Mezei.132 The regulations further provided that such aliens
 could be excluded without a hearing where, as in Mezei's case, disclosure of
 the specific grounds for exclusion also would be "prejudicial to the public inter-
 402 U.S. 389, 408-10 (1971) (rejecting due process challenge based on lack of separation of functions in
 social security disability hearings). Marcelkl arose after an appropriations rider had legislatively overruled
 Wong Yang Sung by expressly stating that the APA did not cover "exclusion or expulsion" of aliens. Act
 of Sep. 27, 1950, ch. 1052, ? 1, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048. Marcello decided that the 1952 Immigration and Na-
 tionality Act continued this limitation on APA coverage; enforcement officials could also preside over
 hearings, but not do both in the same case. The Court then had to decide if the statute, so construed, violated
 constitutional due process, and the Court held without extended discussion that it did not. Cf. Marcello, 349
 U.S. at 315-19 (Black, J., dissenting) (would read statute differently, so would not reach due process issue);
 Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 53 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("In this case no one questions the constitutionality
 of the hearing Wong received ...."). The constitutional issues in Marcello and Wong Yang Sung were
 similar but not identical to each other. The 11917 Act had separated adjudicative from investigative functions
 but not from prosecutorial functions in the same case. Under the 1952 law, hearing officers with either
 investigative or prosecutorial functions could not preside over the same case, though they remained under
 the supervision of officials with investigative and prosecuting functions. INA ? 242(b), 8 U.S.C. ? 1252(b)
 (1988). To see Wong Yang Sung as a statutory decision and Marcello as a constitutional one helps answer
 the question posed by Peter Schuck, "[H]ow could the 1950 appropriations rider possibly have overruled
 Wong Yang Sung?" Schuck, supra note 6, at 33 (Wong Yang Sung was a constitutional decision). See also
 Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 30-34, 72-73. For background from a first-hand perspective, see Rawitz, From
 Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 453 (1989).
 131. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
 132. Id. at 591-92; 8 C.F.R. ? 175.53 (1953).
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 est."'33 Subconstitutionally, Chew argued that the regulation did not apply to
 him. Alternatively, he made the constitutional claim that excluding him without
 a hearing would deny his procedural due process rights as a returning perma-
 nent resident.
 The Court's holding that the summary exclusion regulation did not apply
 to Chew was subconstitutional.134 This was a highly questionable reading of
 the regulation's text that Louis Henkin rightly called one of the Court's "feats
 of creative interpretation" in immigration law.135 The Court was careful to
 disclaim reaching the constitutional issue,136 but as Mezei soon confirmed,
 Chew's underlying reasoning was unmistakably constitutional. 137 The
 opinion's language, especially its references to Yick Wo, Wong Yang Sung, and
 Justice Murphy's concurring opinion in Bridges,138 suggests that the Court
 favored a constitutional norm of procedural due process for returning permanent
 residents like Chew, even if the statute and regulations, by applying the reentry
 doctrine to a temporary departure, treated them no better than first-time en-
 trants.139 In 1953, however, any such constitutional norm was a phantom
 because, as the Court would soon confirm in Mezei, aliens seeking admission
 could not challenge immigration law on explicitly constitutional grounds. At
 the same time, the phantom norm had enough gravitational force, to exercise
 a pull on the Court's interpretation of the regulation. The Chew opinion thus
 subconstitutionally reached the result that the expressly constitutional holding
 in Mezei seemed to preclude.
 133. Chew, 344 U.S. at 591-92; 8 C.F.R. ? 175.57(b) (1953).
 134. 344 U.S. at 600 ("Section 175.57(b)'s authorization of the denial of hearings raises no constitu-
 tional conflict if limited to 'excludable' aliens who are not within the protection of the Fifth Amendment.").
 135. Henkin, The Constitution and the United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and
 Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 861 n.40 (1987).
 136. Chew, 344 U.S. at 602 ("We do not reach the issue as to what would be the constitutional status
 of 8 CFR ? 175.57(b) if it were interpreted as denying to petitioner all opportunity for a hearing."). See
 also Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214 (in Chew, "to escape constitutional conflict we held the administrative
 regulations authorizing exclusion without hearing in certain security cases inapplicable to aliens so protected
 by the Fifth Amendment") (cuing Chew, 344 U.S. at 600).
 137. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213 ("a lawful resident alien may not captiously be deprived of his
 constitutional rights to procedu ral due process") (citing Chew, 344 U.S. at 601). The Court further confirmed
 the constitutional character of the reasoning of Chew in two important cases that Part ll.C discusses. See
 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982) ("the rationale [in Chew] was orV, of constitutional law");
 Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 460 (1963) ("the returning resident alien is entitled as a matter of due
 process to a hearing on the charges underlying any attempt to exclude him") (citing Chew, 344 U.S. 590).
 138. 344 U.S. at 596-98 nn.5-7.
 139. "For purposes of his constitutional right to due process, we assimilate petitioner's status to that
 of an alien continuously residing and physically present in the United States." Id. at 596. Mezei distinguished
 Chew by remarking that Chew had "with fUll security clearance and documentation pursued his vocation
 for four months aboard an American ship," while Mezei had "apparently without authorization or reentry
 papers, simply left the United states and remained behind the Iron Curtain for 19 months." Mezei, 345 U.S.
 at 214. Scholarship from that era raised similar concerns about the treatment of returning permanent
 residents. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 48, at 1392-93; Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully
 Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 262 (1959);
 Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases,
 68 YALE L.J. 1578 (1959).
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 Another example of the influence of phantom norms is the Court's 1966
 decision in Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)."4
 There, a majority held that the government must show deportability by "clear,
 unequivocal, and convincing evidence," rather than by a "preponderance of the
 evidence" as the government had urged.141 While the Court's opinion claimed
 to turn solely on a statute, the Court, as in Chew, relied heavily on constitu-
 tional considerations of the kind that the Court would recognize in the proce-
 dural due process revolution that began a few years afterwards with the Court's
 1970 decision in Goldberg v. Kelly.142 Indeed, on at least one later occasion,
 the Court characterized Woodby as a constitutional decision based on notions
 of fundamental fairness.143 In particular, the Woodby Court noted the harsh
 consequences of deportation and that many permanent residents had strong ties
 to this country.144 Guided by a strong constitutional due process norm, the
 Court interpreted the immigration statute to require more procedural due process
 than was available in an ordinary civil proceeding. As in Chew, that norm was
 a phantom.145 Earlier cases starting with Yamataya146 had suggested some
 procedural due process minimum, but in fact the strictest real norm had im-
 posed only the most modest requirements that have never begun to approach
 the constitutional protections of criminal procedure.147
 140. 385 U.S. 276 (1966). David Martin has suggested that both Fong Haw Tan, D. MARTIN, supra
 note 9, at 19, and Woodby, id. at 25-27, were attempts to compensate for the relative unavailability of
 judicial review in classical immigration law.
 141. 385 U.S. at 281-84. The government relied mainly on references in the statute to "reasonable,
 substantial, and probative evidence." INA ?? 106(a)(4), 242(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. ?? llO5a(a)(4), 1252(b)(4)
 (1988). The majority interpreted this language to set the standard for judicial review, not for the deportation
 proceedings in the first instance. Justice Clark, joined in dissent by Justice Harlan, would have decided for
 the government based on the language and legislative history of INA ? 242(b). 385 U.S. at 287-91 (Clark,
 J., dissenting). Cf. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988) (denaturalization proceedings);
 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1940) (same).
 142. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Perry v. Sinderman,
 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
 143. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756, 759 (1982). But cf. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252,
 266 (1980) (Woodby did not purport to be constitutional holding). The Immigration Marriage Fraud
 Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537, may force courts to decide what standard of
 proof the Constitution requires. INA ? 216(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. ? 1186a(b)(2) (1988), gives the INS the burden
 to prove by a mere preponderance of the evidence that an alien in deportation is not entitled to the condi-
 tional resident status created by IMFA.
 144. 385 U.S. at 285 ("To be sure, a deportation proceeding is not a criminal prosecution.... But
 it does not syllogistically follow that a person may be banished from this country upon no higher degree
 of proof than applies in a negligence case. This Court has not closed its eyes to the drastic deprivations that
 may follow when a resident of this country is compelled by our Government to forsake all the bonds formed
 here and go to a foreign land where he often has no contemporary identification.").
 145. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), discussed supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
 See generally Developments in the Law-Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 680-82, 690-
 95 (1953).
 146. Yamataya, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), discussed supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
 147. Leading cases rejecting the argument that deportation amounts to criminal punishment are cited
 supra note 107.
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 A pattern emerges from Bridges, Fong Haw Tan, Wong Yang Sung, Chew,
 and Woodby.148 In Bridges, Fong Haw Tan, and Wong Yang Sung, the Court
 allowed phantom constitutional norms to guide statutory interpretation by
 reading statutes in favor of aliens. In Chew and Woodby, phantom norm deci-
 sionmaking produced results that directly conflicted with those that the Court
 would have reached by applying the "real" constitutional norms.149 Further
 evidence of the sway of phantom norms is found in the fact that dissenting
 opinions also relied on such norms. In Knauff, for example, Justices Frankfurter
 and Jackson did not criticize the majority for its constitutional holding. Rather,
 they urged the Court to interpret the ambiguous statute against summary
 exclusion, an interpretation that would have been in accordance with a phantom
 constitutional norm of procedural due process in exclusion.150
 These phantom norm decisions represent an aberrational application of the
 canon that judges should interpret statutes to avoid constitutional doubts. The
 usual reason for applying the canon is to avoid defining what the Constitution
 means with virtually irrevocable finality, and yet to provide a just result. This
 rationale is valid only when the directly and indirectly applicable constitutional
 norms are roughly consistent with each other. Where direct and indirect norms
 harmonize with each other, "'underenforced' constitutional norms"'151 and
 148. Some counterexamples from this period deserve mention. I believe that they do not undermine
 my basic thesis, since I do not claim that the Court seized every opportunity to interpret subconstitutional
 texts by relying on a phantom norm, only that enough decisions did so to allow us to identify it as a type
 of judicial decisionmaking in immigration cases. The Court rejected both subconstitutional and constitutional
 challenges in at least two other cases from the same general period. In Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954),
 Justice Frankfurter first rejected the argument that the deportation ground for Communist Party membership,
 Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, ? 22, 64 Stat. 987, 1006 (substantially codified at INA
 ? 241(a)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. ? 1251(a)(6)(C) (1988)), should be read to exclude any member not "fully
 cognizant of the Party's advocacy of violence." 347 U.S. at 528. He then rejected the constitutional attack
 on the same statute. Id. at 529-32. See also Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 357 (1956) ("[Wle must adopt the
 plain meaning of [the suspension of the deportation] statute, however severe the consequences.") (citing
 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 528 (1954)). A third counterexample is Knauff, where the Court could have
 taken a statutory approach but did not. See Hart, supra note 48, at 1395 ("the War Brides Act was highly
 ambiguous on the point in issue of whether exclusion without a hearing was authorized"). Mezei and
 Harisiades are not counterexamples because subconstitutional solutions would have involved much more
 strained readings of the applicable statutes or regulations.
 149. A similar case in a related area of law is Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), which arose when
 several United States citizens sued to force the Department of State to issue them passports so that they
 could travel abroad. While Justice Douglas' reasoning for the majority was based on the constitutional right
 to travel, the decision was clearly subconstitutional-the Department's regulations, which elicited information
 on passport applicants' political affiliations, exceeded the scope of its statutory authority. "Since we start
 with an exercise by an American citizen of an activity included in constitutional protection, we will not
 readily infer that Congress gave the Secretary of State unbridled discretion to grant or withhold it." Id. at
 129. Justice Clark, writing for the four dissenters, disagreed with the majority's reading of congressional
 intent and would have found that the Department of State acted within its statutory authority. Id. at 130-43
 (Clark, J., dissenting). Kent is a phantom norm case like Chew and Woodby in that no tradition of constitu-
 tional judicial review of executive decisions regarding passports existed.
 150. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
 dissenting); id. at 551-52 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
 151. See Sager, supra note 87, at 1213-20; see also Sunstein, supra note 77, at 468 ("courts underen-
 force many constitutional norms").
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 "constitutional common law" sensibly and justifiably arise. 152 But neither this
 reasoning nor this terminology applies where the constitutional norms underly-
 ing subconstitutional decisions are phantom norms. This duality of constitutional
 norms present in immigration law makes Chew and Woodby quite different
 from Bob Jones and other examples of constitutionally influenced statutory
 interpretation in mainstream public law.
 I recognize that describing norms as "real" is not a simple matter. The
 "racial equality" norm, for example, is derived from a series of concrete
 decisions, none of which need be explained that abstractly. If the norm is
 "real," how do we account for a case like Washington v. Davis,"53 which
 established the principle that a finding of unconstitutional race discrimination
 requires proof of discriminatory purpose in addition to proof of discriminatory
 effect? In my view, that case represents underenforcement of the norm, though
 not the particular type of underenforcement represented by avoidance of
 constitutional issues through statutory interpretation. The Washington v. Davis
 Court had prudential reasons for its decision; it was responding to perceived
 limits on the judiciary's institutional capacity to measure unlawful discrimina-
 tion. While that underenforcement may have been unjustified, and while it may
 represent a practical retrenchment of race remedies doctrine,154 Washington
 v. Davis and similar cases affirm the basic proscription against racial discrimi-
 nation. "Norms" are by definition standards of some generality, much broader
 than the rule laid down in Washington v. Davis. In identifying constitutional
 norms that courts adopt as background for statutory interpretation, we must
 accept the degree of generality with which litigants and judges tend to invoke
 them. As with the state action, standing, and political question doctrines, the
 interstitial cases in which the norm is not fully enforced do not take away from
 the existence of the norm against racial discrimination if it can be established
 from other sources. Indeed, the norm has become so engrained that even a court
 hostile to civil rights could not plausibly call into question the fundamental
 principle against racial discrimination that many questioned in all seriousness
 before Brown.
 Unlike the standing or political question doctrines, however, the plenary
 power doctrine smothers the entire field of immigration law so completely that
 it is difficult to find the benchmarks of "full enforcement" of real norms."'5
 In 1953 no immigration decisions had established a constitutional norm prohib-
 152. See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
 153. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
 154. See, e.g., Delgado, On Taking Back Our Civil Rights Promises: When Equality Doesn't Compute,
 1989 Wis. L. REV. 579, 583-84.
 155. Of the examples offered by William Eskridge of groups-"ldiscrete and insular minori-
 ties"-favored by statutory interpretation, only aliens in immigration law cases stand out as unprotected
 by analogous judicial concern at the constitutional level. See Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1032-34 (1989);
 see also Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and The Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian
 Law, CALF. L. REV. (forthcoming 1990); Sunstein, supra note 77, at 472-73, 483-86.
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 citing exclusion of a returning permanent resident without a hearing. If there had
 been such a case, then Chew, like Bob Jones, might be an example of interpret-
 ing a statute to avoid constitutional doubt and thus of underenforcing a real
 constitutional norm to avoid unnecessary friction between the branches of
 government. Or more generally, if plenary power were repudiated, subconstitu-
 tional immigration cases would look a lot more like subconstitutional race
 cases. In Chew and Woodby, the majority's sense of what the constitutional law
 should be in the future guided the Court's interpretation of the statute. The
 Court could have disposed of the case consistent with the reigning constitutional
 norm, or it could have replaced the plenary power doctrine with a constitutional
 norm favorable to aliens. However, the Court was unwilling to adopt either
 course, and instead adopted the middle ground of interpreting the statute in
 accordance with a phantom constitutional norm.'56
 C. Constitutional Change: From Phantom Norms to Real Norms
 In the past twenty-five years, one key aspect of the movement away from
 classical immigration law has been an increasing acceptance of the view that
 an alien's constitutional status when challenging immigration statutes should
 depend on more than just her geographic location. A returning permanent
 resident, even if outside the United States, typically has ties or a "stake" here
 that merit more exacting constitutional scrutiny than that available to first-time
 entrants.157 As Chew suggests, the first stage in this development was the
 emergence of a phantom constitutional norm that recognized a resident alien's
 stake in this country and served as a guide to further statutory interpretation.
 Later cases suggest that through phantom norm decisionmaking, subconstitu-
 156. When a decision relies on a real constitutional norm to guide statutory interpretation, it need not
 be as careful to avoid a constitutional pronouncement as a decision, such as Chew, that relies on a phantom
 norm. A good illustration is Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), discussed supra text accompanying
 notes 42-44. Yamataya is usually read as a constitutional decision. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States
 ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (Yamataya established that "aliens who have once passed through
 our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of
 fairness encompassed in due process of law"); T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 408 ("The
 Japanese Immigrant Case [Yamatayal stands for the proposition that deportation procedures must conform
 to the dictates of the due process clause of the Constitution."). The Court did speak constitutionally. See
 189 U.S. at 100 ("[Tlhis court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that administra-
 tive officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the
 fundamental principles that inhere in 'due process of law."'). But the holding was also cast in
 subconstitutional terms. See id. at 101 ("The words here used do not require an interpretation that would
 invest executive or administrative officers with the absolute, arbitrary power implied in the contention of
 the appellant." The Court was not particularly careful to avoid deciding constitutional issues, in large part
 because it was willing to say that the constitutional norm was real. Two other examples of the Supreme
 Court's uncritical willingness to pronounce on constitutional issues may be found in the part of Wong Yang
 Sung that relies on a real constitutional norm, and in United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201-02
 (1957) (construing statute to limit Attorney General's authority to interrogate aliens in custody pending
 deportation because broader reading would raise constitutional doubts).
 157. See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 453-63.
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 tional immigration law gradually became the engine that would drive constitu-
 tional change.
 The Court's 1963 decision in Rosenberg v. Fleuti is one milestone in the
 transition from phantom to real of a norm recognizing a returning resident
 alien's stake.58 Fleuti, a permanent resident since 1952, took a short trip of
 "about a couple hours" to Mexico in 1956.159 In 1959, the Immigration and
 Naturalization Service ("INS") tried to deport him as an an alien "excludable
 by the law existing at the time of . .. entry."160 The INS sought to declare
 Fleuti excludable on the ground that, by virtue of his homosexuality, Fleuti was
 "afflicted with psychopathic personality."16' The Ninth Circuit set aside the
 deportation, holding that, as applied to homosexuality, the term "psychopathic
 personality" was unconstitutionally vague.162 The Supreme Court held for
 Fleuti on the altogether different ground that he had not "entered" the United
 States in 1956. This conclusion was fatal to the government's case because
 "psychopathic personality" had become an exclusion ground between Fleuti's
 initial entry in 1952 and his possible "reentry" in 1956. If he last entered in
 1952, he had not been excludable at entry and thus was not deportable. Modify-
 ing the reentry doctrine significantly, the Court defined "entry" so as to avoid
 application where an alien returned to the United States from a temporary
 absence that was not "meaningfully interruptive" of permanent residence. 163
 The Fleuti Court reasoned that the 1952 Act, which had amended the statutorily
 imposed definition of "entry" expressly to exclude a return from an unexpected
 or involuntary absence,164 must also have intended to exempt "innocent, casu-
 al, and brief' trips like Fleuti's.165
 158. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
 159. Id. at 450.
 160. INA ? 241(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. ? 1251(a)(1) (1988).
 161. INA ? 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. ? 1182(a)(4) (1988). The INS had argued earlier that Fleuti had been
 excludable in 1956 because he had been "convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude," INA ? 212(a)(9),
 8 U.S.C. ? 1182(a)(9) (1988), but the crime turned out to be a petty offense insufficient for exclusion. See
 Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 656 n.10 (9th Cir. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963);
 see also 374 U.S. at 450.
 162. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 655-58 (9th Cir. 1962) ("psychopathic personality" unconsti-
 tutionally vague absent case law that might have clarified statute), aff'd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449
 (1963).
 163. 374 U.S. at 462.
 164. Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, ? 101, 66 Stat. 163, 167. The amendment codified
 the holdings of two cases that had avoided especially harsh applications of the reentry doctrine. See
 Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947) (alien on sleeping car from Buffalo to Detroit, unaware that
 train would travel through Canada, did not "enter" upon arrival in Detroit); DiPasquale v. Karnuth, 158
 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947) (alien rescued and taken to Cuba for one week from ship that had been torpedoed
 and sunk did not "enter" upon his return to the United States).
 165. 374 U.S. at 457-58 ("[Tjhe major congressional concern in codifying the definition of 'entry' was
 with 'the status of an alien who has previously entered the United States and resided therein .... ' This
 concern was in the direction of ameliorating the harsh results visited upon resident aliens by the rule of
 United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith .... Congress, in approving the judicial undermining of Volpe, and
 the relief brought about by the Di Pasquale and Delgadillo decisions, could not have meant to limit the
 meaning of the exceptions it created in ? 101(a)(13) to the facts of those two cases." (citation omitted)).
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 In large part, the majority's Fleuti opinion, like Chew, evinces sympathy
 for the view that immigration law inadequately recognized a permanent resi-
 dent's stake in remaining in the United States. This observation explains several
 aspects of the opinion: the focus on the harshness of the leading reentry doc-
 trine case, United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith,"66 and on the hardships that
 Fleuti would suffer if deported;167 citation to Chew for the observation that
 "a resident alien who leaves this country is to be regarded as retaining certain
 basic rights";'68 and the call for "more civilized application of our immigra-
 tion laws ... "169 But as in Chew and Woodby, the constitutional norm that
 guided Fleuti's reading of "entry" was a phantom, which in turn explains why
 the Court decided the case by interpreting "entry" in the statute, rather than by
 striking down the statute as unconstitutional. No decision of the Court had
 openly recognized procedural due process rights for an alien seeking entry, not
 even for a returning permanent resident. Indeed, Mezei had suggested and
 perhaps even held to the contrary. Still, the phantom norm of procedural due
 process for returning permanent residents was close enough to the constitutional
 horizon that it is unsurprising that the Court adopted it as a guide to statutory
 interpretation. Using this norm, the Court construed "entry" to recognize stake,
 even if prevailing doctrine did not permit a direct constitutional holding.
 The Court's recognition of Fleuti's stake through the definition of "entry,"
 but not through other subconstitutional elements of the government's case
 against him, suggests that phantom norm decisions must rely on constitutional
 norms that are "real" enough to exercise gravitational pull, even if they have
 not yet appeared above the constitutional horizon. If the Court had found that
 Fleuti had "entered" in 1956, the case's center of gravity would have shifted
 to the statutory exclusion ground of "psychopathic personality" and the consti-
 tutional attack on that ground as void-for-vagueness. The term "psychopathic
 personality" and the term "entry" were similar in one respect-both required
 ignoring clear legislative intent before Fleuti could win a favorable subconstitu-
 tional outcome. Congress almost certainly intended the term "psychopathic
 personality" to apply to homosexuals.170 And, as Justice Clark noted in dis-
 166. 374 U.S. at 453 (noting that Volpe had been deported "after 24 years of residence in this
 country"). United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933), is discussed supra note 57.
 167. 374 U.S. at 458 (Fleuti's interests are "high and momentous"); id. at 459 deportationatin can
 be the equivalent of banishment or exile"') (citing Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1954); Fong
 Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945); Ng Fung Ho v.
 White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).
 168. 374 U.S. at 460.
 169. Id. at 462.
 170. The statute was enacted pursuant to a Senate Judiciary Committee report and recommendation
 that "homosexuals and other sex perverts" be excluded. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1950).
 The Senate Report accompanying the bill noted: 'The Public Health Service has advised that the provision
 for the exclusion of aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality or a mental defect which appears in the
 instant bill is sufficiently broad to provide for the exclusion of homosexuals and sex perverts. This change
 of nomenclature is not to be construed in any way as modifying the intent to exclude all aliens who are
 sexual deviates." S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1950). See also H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong.,
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 sent, Congress probably also intended the term "entry" to cover Fleuti's return
 from Mexico, having allowed only limited exceptions to the statutory definition
 of "entry." Indeed, Congress had even rejected amendments that would have
 covered Fleuti.171 The Court's focus on "entry" reveals that a constitutional
 norm that would declare the term "psychopathic personality" void-for-vagueness
 was even more of a phantom, far off in the constitutional distance. In fact,
 seven years later the Court squarely rejected a vagueness challenge to the same
 statute. 172 A judicial interpretation of the term "psychopathic personality" that
 did not include homosexuality would have required reliance on an even less
 palpable constitutional norm than did the interpretation of the word "entry." 173
 Limits on what the Court could read into "entry" inevitably rendered Fleuti
 an incomplete solution. It did nothing for some returning permanent resi-
 dents-those with a "meaningfully interruptive" absence-even if they could
 claim a "stake" of constitutional dimensions.174 Cases were bound to arise
 in which the statutory solution was inadequate, adding to the pressure for open
 recognition of the underlying constitutional reasoning. In a 1982 case, Landon
 v. Plasencia,175 the Court took the logical next step: it addressed the constitu-
 tional issue directly and made "real" the phantom constitutional norm that had
 previously been used only as a guide to statutory interpretation.
 Maria Antonieta Plasencia, a citizen of El Salvador, had been a permanent
 resident of the United States since 1970. She lived in Los Angeles with her
 husband, who was a United States citizen, and their children. In 1975, the INS
 detained her upon her return from a brief trip she and her husband had taken
 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1652, 1701 (quoting and adopting
 Public Health Service report recommending that the term "psychopathic personality" be used to "specify
 such types of pathologic behavior as homosexuality or sexual perversion"). See generally Boutilier v. INS,
 387 U.S. 118, 122 (1967) ("Congress used the phrase 'psychopathic personality' not in the clinical sense,
 but to effectuate its purpose to exclude from entry all homosexuals and other sex perverts."); Aleinikoff,
 supra note 86, at 47-54. But cf. Boutilier v. INS, 363 F.2d 488, 496-99 (2d Cir. 1966) (Moore, J., dissenting)
 (Congress intended to exclude only if homosexuality amounted to personality disorder in individual);
 Eskridge, GadamerlStatutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 642-44 (1990) (discussing the
 difficulties of determining the legislative intent behind INA ? 212(a)(4)).
 171. See Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 463-68 (Clark, J., dissenting); see also T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra
 note 15, at 335 ("Isn't Fleuti an embarassment to the United States Supreme Court? Isn't the dissent clearly
 correct that the majority rewrote the statute along the lines of proposals made to, but rejected by, Con-
 gress?"); Comment, Exclusion and Deportation of Resident Aliens: The Re-Entry Doctrine and the Need
 for Reform, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 192, 197-200 (1975).
 172. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123-24 (1967) (deportation ground not based on post-entry
 conduct, therefore "no necessity exists for guidance so that one may avoid the applicability of the law";
 "Congress has plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens."); see also Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S.
 32, 40-41 (1924); cf. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229-32 (1951) (caselaw keeps deportation statute
 for crime of "moral turpitude" from being unconstitutionally vague).
 173. At the time that the Court decided Fleuti, prevailing medical opinion had not yet changed in the
 way that later prompted the Ninth Circuit to interpret the statute not to permit exclusion of homosexuals
 without a medical certificate of excludability. See Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1481 (9th Cir. 1983), aff g
 Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569, 579-80 (N.D. Cal. 1982); see also infra text
 accompanying notes 287-94.
 174. The incomplete or underinclusive solution, which is a more general problem with phantom norm
 decisionmaking, is discussed more fully infra text accompanying notes 308-13.
 175. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
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 to Mexico. The INS considered her excludable rather than deportable as an
 "entering" alien on the ground that the Fleuti exception did not apply. The
 Service then excluded her for allegedly having aided six Mexican and Salva-
 doran nationals, who traveled with her in their attempt illegally to enter the
 United States.176 After the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed
 Plasencia's appeal, she successfully filed for habeas corpus in the district court,
 which found that the INS had mistakenly placed her in the exclusion category
 for the purpose of deciding if her return was an "entry." A Ninth Circuit panel
 affirmed, relying heavily on Chew. The panel declared broadly: "[A] permanent
 resident alien does not lose the procedural protection to which he is otherwise
 entitled simply by making a brief journey abroad." 177 But the constitutional
 norm that would afford procedural due process to reentering permanent resi-
 dents in exclusion hearings was just a phantom, and understandably the panel
 limited itself to interpreting the statute to afford Plasencia a deportation hearing
 to decide whether her return was an "entry."
 The Supreme Court could have affirmed on the statutory ground, a course
 that would have been consistent with its approach in Chew and Fleuti. Instead,
 it construed the statute to label Plasencia as excludable rather than deportable.
 Reaching the constitutional issue, the Court held that even a returning perma-
 nent resident subject to exclusion "can invoke the Due Process
 Clause .... "178 The Court distinguished Mezei as involving a much longer
 absence179 and held that an alien's constitutional status does not depend strict-
 ly on the statutory exclusion or deportation categories. The Court openly recog-
 nized its holding's pedigree by relying heavily on the same constitutional
 considerations that had guided statutory interpretation in Chew and Fleuti.
 "[O]nce an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties
 that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes according-
 ly."9180 Justice O'Connor wrote that "[a]lthough the holding [in Chew] was
 one of regulatory interpretation, the rationale was one of constitutional law,"
 176. INA ? 212(a)(31), 8 U.S.C. ? 1182(a)(31) (1988), excludes "[amny alien who at any time shall
 have, knowingly and for gain, encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or
 to try to enter the United States in violation of law."
 177. Plasencia v. Sureck, 637 F.2d 1286, 1288 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Landon v. Plasencia,
 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
 178. 459 U.S. at 32. The Court declined to say if the process afforded to Plasencia was sufficient and
 remanded on that issue.
 179. Id. at 34.
 180. Id. at 32 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950)). See also D. MARTIN, supra
 note 9, at 24 ("After Plasencia, due process protection no longer turns entirely on the distinction between
 exclusion cases and deportation cases-that is, on whether the alien is at the border or in the interior of
 the country. In some settings, at least, the courts may undertake a more sensitive inquiry into the alien's
 community ties in assessing procedural requirements under the Constitution."); cf. Rafeedie v. INS, 880
 F.2d 506,519-25 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (preliminary injunction against summary exclusion of returning permanent
 resident), discussed in greater detail infra text accompanying notes 322-28.
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 and she cited Fleuti as having acknowledged this aspect of Chew.18" In Chew
 and Fleuti the constitutional norms were phantoms, and Plasencia transformed
 them into "real" constitutional immigration law.
 III. CONTEMPORARY PLENARY POWER:
 CONSTITUTIONAL V. STATUTORY LAW
 A. Phantom Norm Review of Executive Action
 Plasencia is vital to this story because it shows that phantom norms can
 represent a transitional phase. But Plasencia addressed just one constitutional
 aspect of classical immigration law-procedural due process for returning
 permanent residents-leaving many others untouched. It said nothing about
 substantive constitutional claims by permanent residents, such as the claim that
 the Constitution prevents the government from deporting them for speech
 protected by the First Amendment. Nor did Plasencia say anything about claims
 asserted by those who were not permanent residents. In other recent cases,
 courts have recognized some of these claims through subconstitutional decisions
 guided by phantom constitutional norms, as in Chew and Fleuti. It remains to
 be seen whether these phantom norms will become part of the directly applied
 constitutional immigration law.
 These recent phantom norm decisions have endorsed some degree of judicial
 review of immigration decisions committed by Congress to an agency of the
 executive branch. Of course, some of the earlier phantom norm decisions,
 certainly including both Chew and Woodby, also can be characterized as judicial
 review of agency decisions. But more recent cases vary from the early phantom
 norm decisions in one important sense. Their reasoning is distinctive-it relies
 heavily on first characterizing the decision as one of agency rather than legisla-
 tive action, and then scrutinizing that agency action for subconstitutional
 defects.
 The genesis of this decisionmaking pattern is complex; it reflects the
 emergence and combination of four views about the proper scope of judicial
 review. First, courts are more competent to review immigration decisions by
 agencies than by Congress. The first element is best explained through the
 Court's 1972 decision in Kleindienst v. Mandel, which upheld the denial of a
 181. 459 U.S. at 33 ("Any doubts that Chew recognized constitutional rights in the resident alien
 returning from a brief trip abroad were dispelled by Rosenberg v. Fleuti, where we described Chew as
 holding 'that the returning resident alien is entitled as a matter of due process to a hearing on the charges
 underlying any attempt to exclude him."'). See also Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 520-21 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
 ("Chew was a constitutional decision"), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 688 F. Supp. 729, 743 (D.D.C. 1988)
 ("While the Supreme Court in Chew cast its conclusion in statutory terms, the decision itself and subsequent
 cases have made clear that the rationale was a constitutional one; even though the Court did not hold the
 regulation facially unconstitutional, it found that the statute could not constitutionally be applied to Chew.")
 (footnote and citations omitted).
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 nonimmigrant visa to Ernest Mandel, a Belgian journalist and self-described
 "revolutionary Marxist."1182 In 1968, Mandel received invitations from various
 universities throughout the United States. For two earlier visits, the government,
 without his knowledge, had exercised its statutory discretion to waive the
 exclusion ground for Communists, but this time it declined to do so.183 Mand-
 el and several of the United States citizen professors who had invited him sued,
 relying primarily on the argument that the First Amendment guaranteed them
 the right to meet and speak with Mandel."8
 Mandel is important for our purposes because in that case the Court sug-
 gested a distinction between decisions made directly by Congress in an immi-
 gration statute and enforcement of those statutes by the executive branch.
 According to the Court, the plaintiffs raised a First Amendment challenge not
 to the plenary power doctrine itself, but just to the Attorney General's discre-
 tionary decision not to waive exclusion.185 The government argued that the
 Attorney General is vested with "sole and unfettered discretion" to deny waiver
 by giving "any reason or no reason" at all,186 but the Court found that it did
 not need to decide this question. Instead, it found that the Attorney General had
 given a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for his decision, and that this
 foreclosed further judicial review.187 But by distinguishing the plenary power
 cases and conditioning its approval of discretionary decisions by requiring the
 government to offer a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason," the Court
 suggested some outer limits to executive discretion that might not apply to
 direct congressional decisions.
 Mandel's suggested distinction between executive actions and legislative
 acts has found its way into lower court decisions that have scrutinized executive
 branch immigration decisions more closely than the plenary power doctrine
 would seem to allow.188 The distinction reflects the view that courts intrude
 182. 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972).
 183. INA ? 212(d)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. ? 1182(d)(3) (1988), allows discretionary waiver of the ideological
 exclusion grounds applied to Mandel, which were NA ? 212(a)(28)(D) & (G)(v), 8 U.S.C. ? 1182(a)(28)(D)
 & (G)(v) (1988).
 184. The original complaint also alleged violations of equal protection and procedural due process,
 see 408 U.S. at 760, but these issues were not before the Court.
 185. Id. at 767. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented on the grounds that the
 constitutionality of ? 212(a)(28) necessarily came into question, since no waiver would have been necessary
 without that subsection. Id. at 777-84.
 186. Id. at 769.
 187. Id. at 770 ("In the case of an alien excludable under ? 212(a)(28), Congress has delegated
 conditional exercise of this power ['to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens'] to the Executive.
 We hold that when the Executive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and
 bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing
 its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the
 applicant."). Cf. id. at 774 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Attorney General exceeded his statutory powers because
 his discretion was limited to "matters commonly within the competence of the Department of Jus-
 tice-national security, importation of drugs, and the like").
 188. See, e.g., Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ('The Executive has broad
 discretion over the admission and exclusion of aliens, but that discretion is not boundless. It extends only
 as far as the statutory authority conferred by Congress and may not transgress constitutional limitations.
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 on the legislative sphere more when they review decisions made by Congress
 directly than when they review immigration decisions made by the executive
 branch pursuant to a delegation of power by Congress.189 This maxim is
 especially powerful when the executive operates under a broad grant of authori-
 ty from Congress rather than under narrow or specific congressional direc-
 tion."' With the addition of the three other elements, judicial scrutiny-at
 least in some cases-was to become less restrained than Mandel's apparently
 deferential "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" formula would suggest.
 The second view that contributed to this decisionmaking pattern was
 unremarkable and well established-that courts can review immigration deci-
 sions under a subconstitutional "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discre-
 tion" test, to make sure the executive branch has stayed within congressionally
 It is the duty of the courts, in cases properly before them, to say where those statutory and constitutional
 boundaries lie."), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973,
 998 (S.D. Hla. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 727 F.2d 957
 (1lth Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd as modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (emphasizing importance of distinction
 between review of congressional and agency action); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442,
 452 (S.D. Fla. 1980) ("power of INS is more circumscribed [than Congress'].... Where it has been given
 discretion by statute or treaty, INS may not exercise that discretion arbitrarily or capriciously."), aff'd as
 modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). But cf. Schuck,
 supra note 6, at 15 ("Court has not hesitated to extend this 'special judicial deference to congressional policy
 choices in the immigration context' to administrative officials as well as to the Congress.") (footnote omit-
 ted).
 Even after Mandel, courts still routinely refuse to review visa denials by consular officers overseas.
 See, e.g., Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 1986); Burrafato v. Department
 of State, 523 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976); Pena v. Kissinger, 409 F.
 Supp. 1182, 1185-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); cf. Wong v. Department of State, 789 F.2d 1380, 1384-85 (9th Cir.
 1986) (judicial review of visa revocation, with alien in United States); Shimizu v. Department of State, CV
 89-2741-WMB (C.D. Cal. May 31, 1990), digested in 67 INTERPRETER RELEASEs 699,702 (1990) (judicial
 review of visa revocation, with alien outside United States). For background and analysis regarding visa
 denials and their reviewability, see Recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
 1 C.F.R. ? 305.89-9 (1990); Martin, Mandel, Cheng Fan Kwok, and Other Unappealing Cases: The Next
 Frontier of Immigration Reform, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 803, 809-14 (1987).
 189. Executive decisions may be less appropriate for judicial review than direct legislative decisions
 because they are more "political," but the courts have gradually abandoned the political question doctrine
 as a basis for declining judicial review in immigration cases. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685
 F. Supp. 1488, 1503 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Harvard Law School Forum v. Shultz, 633 F. Supp. 525, 528 (D.
 Mass. 1986); cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), which held unconstitutional the power of either house
 of Congress, by resolution, to overrule discretionary suspension of deportation by the Attorney General for
 reasons of "extreme hardship" under NA ? 244(a)(1), (c)(2), 8 U.S.C. ? 1254(a)(1), (c)(2) (1988). "The
 plenary authority of Congress over aliens under [the naturalization clause] is not open to question, but what
 is challenged here is whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing
 that power." 462 U.S. at 940-41. The decision seems confined to constitutional challenges based on
 separation of powers, instead of limiting plenary power generally, and thus seems akin to the cases that
 recognize more judicial competence to hear procedural due process claims than attacks on substantive
 immigration classifications. Cf. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794 (1977) ("no occasion to consider in this
 case whether there may be actions of the Congress with respect to aliens that are so essentially political
 in character as to be nonjusticiable"). See generally Legomsky, supra note 5, at 255, 261-69.
 190. See, e.g., Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. 1132, 1140 (D.D.C. 1979) (less judicial review if case
 involves "a specific statutory enactment of Congress"), rev'd on other grounds, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir.
 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
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 prescribed bounds."9' Third, judicial review for an "arbitrary and capricious"
 decision or an "abuse of discretion" includes a look at any constitutional doubts
 about the agency decision. Put differently, an executive branch decision is an
 "abuse of discretion" or "arbitrary and capricious" if it relies on unconstitution-
 al premises. 12
 The fourth and capstone element was that courts may broaden the grounds
 for an "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discretion" finding to include
 conflict between agency action and a phantom constitutional norm. In other
 words, even if constitutional doubts about an agency decision are insufficient
 to justify finding it unconstitutional, courts still express those doubts at a
 subconstitutional level through an "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of
 discretion" finding. The reasoning might be that the agency abused its discre-
 tion by violating a phantom constitutional norm, or that the agency exceeded
 its delegated powers under a statute that would be interpreted narrowly using
 a phantom constitutional norm. In either case, the court effectively undermines
 what would seem to be the governing principles of constitutional immigration
 law.
 B. Jean v. Nelson and Other Phantom Norm Decisions
 Thanks to these four elements, in the past decade, phantom norm-based
 subconstitutional review of agency action-a variation on the phantom norm
 decisions of the 1950's and 1960's-has become a widespread method of
 deciding difficult immigration cases in many of the areas left open in Plasencia.
 These more recent immigration cases, like the early phantom norm decisions,
 represent a partial integration into immigration law of the values embodied in
 Yick Wo's treatment of aliens outside of immigration law.'93
 Graham v. Richardson,194 a 1971 Supreme Court decision, is a seminal
 case in Yick Wo's modern legacy. Graham struck down a state-imposed residen-
 cy requirement limiting lawfully admitted aliens' access to welfare benefits. The
 law pertaining to citizenship requirements is just one aspect of the question
 whether the Constitution protects aliens. Although Yick Wo involved race, not
 alienage, recent alienage cases suggest that Yick Wo remains alive and well.
 Beginning its equal protection analysis with that case, the near-unanimous
 191. See, e.g., Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 228-30 (1963) (abuse of discretion is standard for judicial
 review of denials of discretionary relief from deportation); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544 (1952)
 (applying "clear abuse of discretion" standard in upholding the Attorney General's refusal to release aliens
 on "bail" pending deportation proceedings, while noting "the executive judgment is limited by adequate
 standards"); cf. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954) (Board of Immigra-
 tion Appeals must exercise discretion conferred upon it by regulation).
 192. See, e.g., Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966) (agency decision is "abuse
 of discretion if . .. made without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from established policies,
 or rest[s] on an impermissible basis such as an invidious discrimination against a particular race or group").
 193. These earlier cases are discussed supra text accompanying notes 94-108.
 194. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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 Graham Court declared: "[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based
 on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
 scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
 minority ... for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."'195
 Plyler v. Doe,196 a 1982 Supreme Court decision, has similarly broad
 implications. Relying heavily on Yick Wo and Wong Wing, the Court said that
 even undocumented aliens are entitled to constitutional protections and struck
 down a Texas statute that effectively barred children of undocumented aliens
 from attending public schools. Although the Court declined to say that undocu-
 mented aliens are a "suspect class," 197 it found the state statute was not ratio-
 nal because it did not further "some substantial goal of the State." 198 More
 fundamentally, Plyler recognized a radically broader view of the constitutionally
 protected community than that implicit in the plenary power doctrine. Plyler
 recognized the membership of these undocumented children in American
 society as an accomplished fact, and further recognized that they could not be
 excluded by fiat from constitutional rights and privileges.199
 The Court's reasoning in Graham and Plyler seemed broad enough to limit
 not only state laws, which were at issue in those cases and in most recent
 decisions invalidating citizenship requirements,21 but the federal laws as
 well.20" But in fact, the Court has recognized that the federal government's
 195. Id. at 371-72 (8-0 decision with Harlan, J. concurring) (citing United States v. Carotene Prods.
 Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
 196. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
 197. Id. at 219 n.19.
 198. Id. at 224.
 199. See Schuck, supra note 6, at 54 (Plyler "may mark a fundamental break with classical immigration
 law's concept of national community and of the scope of congressional power to decide who is entitled to
 the benefits of membership."). Schuck supports this broad reading of Plyler in part by comparing it with
 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), which suggested that states may enact legislation that discourages
 immigration in ways that are generally consistent with federal policy. Id. at 57. On this broadening of the
 national community in general, see Aleinikoff, Membership, supra note 102, at 20-22; Bosniak, supra note
 102, at 967-87; Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens From Discriminatory Treatment by the National
 Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275; Schuck, supra note 6, at 34-58; cf. Lopez, Undocumented Mexican
 Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 700 (1981) ("If that
 set of attributes [heretofore assumed to be shared only by citizens] is now shared by people without
 citizenship, the interests of that group must be acknowledged and considered; any moral theory of communi-
 ty status that fails to take account of these interests will lose its purpose for being.").
 200. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (notaries public); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S.
 1 (1977) (recipients of financial assistance for higher education); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Otero, 426
 U.S. 572 (1976) (civil engineers); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 n.3 (1973) (attorneys); Sugarman v.
 Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,646 (1973) (civil service employees); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (employees
 in general).
 201. In Graham the Court expressly refrained from deciding if Congress could enact a statute imposing
 on aliens a uniform nationwide residency requirement as a condition of federally funded welfare benefits.
 403 U.S. at 382 n.14. But it discussed supremacy separately as an "additional," and thus, perhaps unneces-
 sary reason for its holding. Id. at 376-77; see also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); In re Griffiths,
 413 U.S. 717, 718 n.3 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973); cf. Toll v. Moreno, 458
 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (state university's policy of denying in-state status to holders of certain nonimmigrant
 visas is invalid under the supremacy clause; Court did not reach due process and equal protection issues);
 Graham, 403 U.S. at 383 (Harlan, J., concurring) (supremacy clause sufficient to invalidate state law); Hines
 v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941) (under supremacy clause, federal alien registration statute precludes
This content downloaded from 
             143.229.43.66 on Wed, 18 Nov 2020 16:25:59 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 1990] Immigration Law 585
 constitutional power over immigration and naturalization gives it greater
 freedom from judicial scrutiny when it classifies by alienage. Hampton v. Mow
 Sun Wong,"02 decided in 1976, involved a challenge to a Civil Service Com-
 mission regulation that made aliens ineligible for most federal employment,
 much like the state regulations that the Court had invalidated three years earlier
 in Sugarman v. Dougall.203 The Court struck down the federal regulation as
 a deprivation of liberty without due process, because it was unwilling to find
 that the Commission had acted in furtherance of national interests connected
 with the immigration and naturalization power.2" But the Court suggested
 that either Congress or the President would have the power to bar aliens from
 federal jobs; indeed, lower courts have consistently upheld the Executive Order
 issued by President Ford shortly after Mow Sun Wong.205 On the same day
 that the Court decided Mow Sun Wong, it also decided Mathews v. Diaz,206
 which challenged a statute, similar to the state welfare rules struck down in
 Graham, that barred aliens from access to federal Medicare unless they were
 permanent residents who had lived in the United States for five years. The
 Court in Diaz upheld the statute, reasoning that "[i]n the exercise of its broad
 power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that
 would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."207
 The ultimate results in the Mow Sun Wong and Diaz litigation sustained the
 power of Congress and the executive branch, and even in the case law con-
 cerning state classifications, Graham and Plyler remain high-water marks. But
 the key lesson is that the reasoning of all of these alienage cases carried on the
 Yick Wo tradition.208 The Court allowed constitutional scrutiny, squarely and
 seriously considering the rights of aliens, in contrast to its cavalier treatment
 of many constitutional claims in immigration cases. Mow Sun Wong said that
 distinctions between aliens and citizens merited constitutional scrutiny.209 In
 Diaz, the Court began by citing Wong Yang Sung, Wong Wing, and Russian
 Volunteer Fleet for the proposition that the Constitution protects aliens from
 deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process, even if their
 enforcement of state alien registration statute). Rosberg, supra note 199, at 316-36, argues that the constitu-
 tional limits on classification by alienage should apply to federal as well as state government.
 202. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
 203. 413 U.S. 634 (1973); cf. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state exclusion of aliens from
 practice of law is unconstitutional).
 204. 426 U.S. at 105, 114-16.
 205. See, e.g., Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
 U.S. 959 (1981); Jalil v. Campbell, 590 F.2d 1120, 1123 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Vergara v. Hampton, 581
 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979).
 206. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
 207. Id. at 79-80.
 208. See Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation, supra note 102, at 865 ("The legacy of Yick Wo has also
 survived and flourished in the 20th century. Outside the immigration process, aliens receive most of the
 constitutional protections afforded citizens."). Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), and its immediate
 progeny are discussed supra text accompanying notes 94-108.
 209. 426 U.S. at 101-03.
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 presence in the country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory.210 Diaz also
 endorsed the view that the character of an alien's stake has constitutional
 significance.211
 Even decisions that have upheld certain types of state alienage classifica-
 tions began their analysis with Yick Wo.212 And in the spirit of Wong Wing,
 the Court has also made it clear that the Fourth Amendment protects aliens in
 the United States, even if the actual holding favored the government.213 Lower
 courts have held that aliens are entitled to Miranda warnings in any custodial
 interrogation that seeks information to be used against them in criminal pro-
 ceedings,214 and that excludable aliens are entitled under the due process
 clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free of gross physical
 abuse at the hands of state or federal officials.215 And when the underlying
 issue is not alienage alone, but race as in Yick Wo itself, the Constitution
 protects persons whether they are citizens or aliens.216 It is also significant
 that in several cases recognizing aliens' constitutional rights, the dissent's
 approach, rejected by implication, was to reason directly from the plenary
 power cases in immigration law.217
 210. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 77. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), is discussed supra text
 accompanying notes 121-30; Wong Wmg v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), is discussed supra text
 accompanying notes 97-99; and Russian Volunteer Fleet, 282 U.S. 481 (1931), is discussed supra text
 accompanying note 100.
 211. 426 U.S. at 80 ("The decision to share that bounty ["that a conscientious sovereign makes
 available to its own citizens and some of its guests"] with our guests may take into account the character
 of the relationship between the alien and this country ....") (emphasis in original).
 212. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 436 (1982) (probation officers); Ambach v.
 Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,72 (1979) (public school teachers). These cases permit denying aliens political rights
 and employment that are believed to be closely tied to the political functions of government; see also Foley
 v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (state troopers).
 213. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976) (Fourth Amendment permits
 Border Patrol's routine stop of vehicle at permanent checkpoint near border without individualized
 suspicion); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975) (Fourth Amendment bars warrantless search
 of vehicle without probable cause at permanent checkpoint near border); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
 422 U.S. 873, 878-87 (1975) (Fourth Amendment bars roving Border Patrol stop of vehicle near border
 based only on appearance of occupants); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973)
 (Fourth Amendment bars warrantless search of vehicle without probable cause by roving Border Patrol);
 cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (Fourth Amendment does not apply to search
 by United States authorities of Mexican residence of Mexican citizen and resident who had no voluntary
 attachment to United States).
 214. United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 913-15 (5th Cir. 1979).
 215. Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1372-74 (5th Cir. 1987); cf. Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp.
 1028, 1040-42 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (harsh conditions of detention of excludable stowaway aliens violated due
 process).
 216. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
 356 (1886).
 217. See Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 117-18,121-22,127 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Kleindienst
 v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
 U.S. 580 (1952), and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)); Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S.
 at 291 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Chae Chan Ping v. United
 States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), and other plenary power
 cases).
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 Indeed, judges who have rendered phantom norm decisions have relied
 heavily on Yick Wo values. The most prominent example of recent phantom
 norm decisionmaking based on these values is Jean v. Nelson,218 which con-
 cerned claims of racial and national origin discrimination in connection with
 detention of Haitian asylum applicants. Similar reasoning is evident in the lower
 courts. The discussion that follows attempts to identify and analyze some of
 the most important of those decisions. It is not intended to be a complete
 catalog of recent phantom norm decisions. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate the
 broad influence of this judicial practice by focusing on four important areas of
 immigration law in which phantom norms seem to explain a number of the
 most significant recent cases. They are: race and national origin discrimination
 claims, indefinite detention of Mariel Cubans, asylum procedures for excludable
 first-time entrants, and First Amendment challenges to exclusion grounds.
 Much as Chew had done, some of these decisions have stopped short of
 declaring executive action unconstitutional and simply invalidated executive
 action solely on an articulated "abuse of discretion" or similar rationale. These
 decisions often openly express constitutional skepticism that lacks support in
 the immigration law precedents. This reasoning allows us to identify them as
 phantom norm decisions. We can identify other decisions as phantom norm
 decisions because those courts have also made alternative findings of unconsti-
 tutionality, again based on phantom norms with little support in immigration
 law. Appellate courts sometimes reverse these constitutional holdings, and
 sometimes not. In some settings, evidence suggests that phantom norms are
 evolving, as illustrated by Plasencia, toward directly applicable constitutional
 immigration law.
 1. Race and National Origin Discrimination: Haitians and Others
 Jean is the most prominent, but not the first, of several recent cases that
 raised the issue whether government policy toward aliens from certain countries
 unlawfully discriminates on the basis of race and national origin. A 1979
 decision, Narenji v. Civiletti,219 tested special reporting requirements for Irani-
 an students after the takeover of the American Embassy in Teheran. The district
 court reached alternative findings. Subconstitutionally, it decided that the
 regulations establishing the requirements lacked statutory authority because the
 enabling statute was "drawn neutrally." The court found "no statutory basis for
 the discriminatory classification established by the regulation such that defen-
 dants could cloak their rule's discriminatory effect in the mantle of congressio-
 218. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
 219. 481 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957
 (1980).
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 nal approval under its power over immigration and naturalization and thereby
 for practical purposes, exempt the regulation from judicial scrutiny."2W
 There is ample evidence that the subconstitutional holding in Narenji was
 based on a phantom constitutional norm barring national origin classifications.
 The court's discussion of the statute follows a citation to Yick Wo for the notion
 that mainstream equal protection analysis should apply to the students' claim
 of unconstitutional discrimination.221 The court also relied on statutes from
 outside immigration law to establish that "Congress has indicated its disdain
 for discrimination based on national origin."222 The court's thinking is also
 clear from the rest of its opinion, which relied on Mow Sun Wong223 to hold
 in the alternative that the regulation was an unconstitutional violation of equal
 protection.2' The District of Columbia Circuit subsequently reversed on both
 subconstitutional and constitutional grounds. In so rejecting the district court's
 constitutional reasoning, the appeals court confirmed that the lower court's
 reasoning was based on a background constitutional norm that was phantom,
 not real.
 Other phantom norm decisions involving race and national origin discrimi-
 nation claims arose in the context of migration of Haitians to the United States,
 most of whom sought political asylum. Until 1982, aliens at the border who
 appeared inadmissible were usually released on parole pending exclusion
 hearings. That year, the government, largely responding to the Haitian influx,
 announced that almost all aliens arriving without entry documents, as most
 Haitians did, would be detained instead.225
 Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti,226 a 1980 case from the Southern
 District of Florida involving claims of national origin discrimination and denial
 of due process, reached alternative subconstitutional and constitutional findings
 as did the court in Narenji v. Civiletti. First, the court found that the INS lacked
 statutory authority to discriminate on the basis of national origin or race where
 Congress had not employed those criteria.227 That this subconstitutional hold-
 220. 481 F. Supp. at 1141.
 221. Id. at 1138 ("Plaintiffs are quite correct in their assertions that the classification in this instance
 is one founded upon national origin and that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection can be evoked
 in most circumstances to protect against the government's invocation of such a standard, even in its dealings
 with aliens.") (citing Yick Wo). The court continued: "[It has been long acknowledged that distinctions
 based on ancestry or national origin are 'odious to a free people whose insitutions are founded upon the
 doctrine of equality."' Id. at 1139 (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
 222. 481 F. Supp. at 1141 (citing 42 U.S.C. ? 2000a (1976) (public accommodations); 42 U.S.C.
 ? 2000b (public facilities); id. ? 2000e-2 (employment)).
 223. 481 F. Supp. at 1144.
 224. Id. at 1145.
 225. See 47 Fed. Reg. 30,044 (1982) (as amended at 47 Fed. Reg. 46,493 (1982)) (amending 8 C.F.R.
 ? 235.3(b)).
 226. 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd as modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith,
 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
 227. 503 F. Supp. at 453 ("INS has no authority to discriminate on the basis of national origin or
 race-except perhaps by promulgating regulations in a time of national emergency"); cf. id. at 452 ("Con-
 gress, if it so chooses, may discriminate against and among aliens on grounds which would violate the
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 ing rested on a constitutional foundation is evident from the opinion as a whole,
 especially in its overwhelming emphasis on the constitutional issues and its
 tendency to treat constitutional and subconstitutional analysis as virtually
 indistinguishable.228 The nature of that constitutional foundation is clear from
 the court's alternative finding of unconstitutional national origin discrimination.
 To make this finding, the court borrowed norms from mainstream constitutional
 law-relying most prominently on Yick Wo229 and Graham230-that
 remained phantoms in the immigration law context.231 The Fifth Circuit did
 not reverse on the constitutional issue, but it expressed skepticism by noting:
 "[W]e do not address the equal protection contentions any more than to observe
 that we do not approve the sweeping conclusions of the district court."232
 The plaintiffs in Vigile v. Sava,233 a 1982 district court case, similarly
 attacked INS detention policy toward Haitian asylum applicants as an abuse
 of discretion and as race and national origin discrimination proscribed by the
 Constitution and international law. The court granted the plaintiffs' relief, but
 restricted its holding to a subconstitutional level. Recognizing that the plenary
 power doctrine barred direct attacks on racial or national origin, the court
 avoided a directly constitutional holding. Instead, it subsumed all substantive
 issues in the case under abuse of discretion analysis, declaring that "invidious
 racial or national origin based discrimination constitutes abuse of discretion
 when insinuated into a neutral grant of decision-making authority."234
 A Second Circuit panel reversed on the ground that the district court's
 review for abuse of discretion had been overbroad.235 But importantly, the
 panel agreed with the district court's use of subconstitutional abuse of discretion
 analysis to borrow constitutional norms from other areas of public law, even
 Constitution if applied to American citizens.").
 228. Id. at 456 (coming very close to equating violations of regulations and operating procedures with
 denials of procedural due process as a constitutional matter). The Fifth Circuit noted this on appeal. Haitian
 Refugee Center, 676 F.2d at 1036 n.29.
 229. 503 F. Supp. at 471 n.50.
 230. Id. at 454.
 231. Id. at 532 (government policy "is offensive to every notion of constitutional due process and equal
 protection").
 232. Haitian Refugee Center, 676 F.2d at 1041.
 233. 535 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d
 204 (2d Cir. 1982).
 234. 535 F. Supp. at 1016; id. at 1007 ("review for abuse of parole discretion is the norm. While
 displaying total restraint on issues of exclusion, federal courts have examined the treatment of aliens awaiting
 that final order."; blanket denial of parole to almost all Haitians was abuse of discretion); id. at 1016 ("Even
 though Congress may employ race or national origin as criteria in determining which aliens to exclude from
 the country, a district director may not apply neutral regulations to discriminate on such grounds."). The
 court reconciled its subconstitutional holding with the plenary power doctrine as follows:
 Judicial review of the parole process, therefore, does not impinge upon the political judgment to
 exclude or accept nor interfere with the executive and legislative power to control our borders.
 It only insures that parole status, which Congress has determined does not necessarily interfere
 with such control, is conferred by district directors within the bounds anticipated by the delegation
 of discretion.
 Id. at 1006.
 235. Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 213-18 (2d Cir. 1982).
This content downloaded from 
             143.229.43.66 on Wed, 18 Nov 2020 16:25:59 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 590 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 100: 545
 when those norms had never been established in constitutional immigration law.
 The panel stated, for example, that "immigration policies based on criteria that
 are not acceptable elsewhere in our public life" would be inconsistent with the
 "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" required by Kleindienst v.
 Mandel.236
 In Jean v. Nelson, a class of Haitian asylum applicants also claimed that
 the INS detention policy unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of race
 and national origin. The district court first decided subconstitutionally that the
 government's new detention policy was invalid because it had not been adopted
 properly under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).237 The effect was
 to restore the old policy, under which the plaintiffs were entitled to be re-
 leased.238 The court also extensively discussed the constitutional equal protec-
 tion issue. In constitutional reasoning that reflected a phantom equal protection
 norm, the court distinguished claimants seeking parole from those seeking
 admission, citing Yick Wo, Wong Wing, Mathews v. Diaz, as well as the lower
 court decision that the Supreme Court later affirmed in Plyler v. Doe.239 Ulti-
 mately, however, the court found that plaintiffs had failed to show a constitu-
 tional violation, leaving the decision to stand on the subconstitutional ground
 alone.740
 On review, an Eleventh Circuit panel concurred with the district court's
 constitutional dictum that the plenary power doctrine did not apply because
 plaintiffs sought parole, not admission.?4' The panel relied on Yick Wo and
 Plyler v. Doe, on Plasencia, as well as on a phantom norm decision, Chew.'42
 Like the district court, the panel actually reached only a subconstitutional
 decision, but it went beyond simply affirming the district court's finding of
 236. Id. at 212 n.12.
 237. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 993-97 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff d in part sub nom. Jean v. Nelson,
 711 F. 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd as modified, 472 U.S.
 846 (1985).
 238. 544 F. Supp. at 1006. The district court stayed its order for 30 days, during which the INS
 promulgated a new parole policy in compliance with the APA.
 239. See id. at 998 whenjhn requesting release on parole, Plaintiffs are entitled to the same constitu-
 tional protections afforded all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States"); see also id.
 at 990 (citing Diaz, 426 U.S. at 77, for proposition that plaintiffs "are persons within the territorial
 jurisdiction of the United States and they cannot be denied their liberty without due process of law").
 240. 544 F. Supp. at 998-1002 (evidence shows no equal protection violation).
 241. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1484 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en
 banc), affd as modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL. Mezei, 345
 U.S. 206, 220 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Realistically, this man is incarcerated by a combination of
 forces which keep him as effectually as a prison, the dominant and proximate cause of these forces being
 the United States immigration authority."); id. at 227 ("Confinement is no longer ancillary to exclusion;
 it can now be justified only as the alternative to normal exclusion. It is an end in itself."). cf. Bertrand v.
 Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1020, 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("There comes a point at which 'temporary' detention takes
 on the aura of permanence."), rev'd on other grounds, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982).
 242. 711 F.2d at 1483-85. The court also relied on Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382
 (IOth Cir. 1981), a phantom norm decision that is discussed in greater detail infra text accompanying notes
 256-65.
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 noncompliance with the APA.43 It reached a second subconstitutional holding
 based on a phantom equal protection norm-whether or not the plenary power
 cases barred plaintiffs from raising a constitutional equal protection claim, the
 statute prohibited discrimination.2" The panel went on to decide that plaintiffs
 had proved unlawful discrimination.'45
 The Eleventh Circuit en banc also spoke subconstitutionally, but it was
 unwilling to use abuse of discretion analysis as a vehicle for expressing phan-
 tom equal protection norms not indigenous to immigration law."46
 Unsurprisingly, it found no defects, forcing it to reach the constitutional issue.
 Flatly disagreeing with the constitutional dicta in the district court and the panel
 opinions, the court en banc held that aliens have no greater right to seek parole
 than to seek admission."- Reasoning that Mezei compelled rejection of
 plaintiffs' constitutional claims,248 it upheld the detention policy. Four judges
 dissented in an opinion that adopted the panel decision's view that the statute
 prohibited discrimination, whether the Constitution did or not.49
 The Supreme Court, like all three lower courts, addressed the
 subconstitutional issue. Noting that the parole regulations were "facially
 neutral" and that the parties all believed them to require "parole decisions to
 be made without regard to race or national origin,"250 the Court found that
 the statute and regulations barred any race or national origin discrimination
 against the Haitians. Unlike the lower courts, the Court declined to address the
 constitutional issue and criticized the Eleventh Circuit en banc opinion for
 243. 711 F.2d at 1474-83.
 244. Id. at 1485 ("Our standard of review under Mezei and Knauff is to assure aliens receive that
 process Congress determined was due; on the record before us we can but determine that Congress intended
 the statutes under which the INS acted to be applied in a non-discriminatory fashion."). For cases basing
 similar subconstitutional results on international law, see Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp.
 442, 453-54 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd as modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023,
 1038 n.35 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270, 1274-77 (S.D. Fla. 1977),
 vacated and remanded without opinion, 566 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978). But cf. Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d
 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982) (international law does not change status under domestic law); Pierre v. United
 States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977) (same), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 434 U.S. 962
 (1977).
 245. 711 F.2d at 1501-02.
 246. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 975-79 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd as modified, 472 U.S. 846
 (1985) ("both executive and congressional actions are to be regulated by the judiciary according to the same
 narrow standard of review"); id. (immigration officials were "acting within the scope of their delegated
 powers"); see also Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 217 (2d Cir. 1982); Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d
 1281, 1289 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 434 U.S. 962 (1977). Jean is a
 variation on the standard abuse of discretion case because lower level INS officials may have failed to
 follow internal INS guidelines. The Eleventh Circuit en banc remanded this question to the district court.
 727 F.2d at 978-79.
 247. 727 F.2d at 963 ("decision to parole or detain an excludable alien is an integral part of the
 admissions process"); see also id. at 969 ("alien's legal status is not altered by detention or parole");
 Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 211-12 (2d Cir. 1982).
 248. 727 F.2d at 969-72.
 249. Id. at 987-89 (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
 250. 472 U.S. 846, 852 (1984). The regulation at that time was 8 C.F.R. ? 212.5 (1982). The current
 regulation is 8 C.F.R. ? 212.5 (1990). See 47 Fed. Reg. 30,044 (1982), (as amended at 47 Fed. Reg. 46,493
 (1982)); see also 8 C.F.R. ?? 212.12, 212.13, 235.3 (1990).
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 having done so.25' It remanded the case to the district court to decide whether
 INS officials had made individualized parole determinations in exercising their
 statutory discretion, and whether they had acted without regard to race or
 national origin.252
 In dissent, Justice Marshall correctly observed that nothing in the statute
 or regulations expressly prohibited consideration of race or national origin in
 parole decisions, notwithstanding any stipulation by the parties.-53 The parties
 to the litigation and all three lower court opinions had viewed any such possible
 restrictions as constitutional in nature, drawn from the Yick Wo tradition.254
 The Court could have expressed that reasoning directly in constitutional terms,
 but had it done so, the Court would have significantly limited the plenary power
 doctrine, especially as set out in Knauff and Mezei. Such a constitutional
 decision would have done for equal protection challenges by asylum applicants
 what Plasencia had done for procedural due process claims by reentering
 permanent residents. Of course, the Court could have taken that step, but as in
 Chew, it was unwilling to do so. As long as it would not decide Jean on
 constitutional grounds, the antidiscrimination norm that guided the Court's
 interpretation of the parole statute and regulations remained a phantom. This
 characterization fits not only the Supreme Court's reasoning in Jean, but also
 the reasoning of the lower courts-none of which had the power even to
 consider overruling or limiting Knauff or Mezei-in Jean and in the other
 discrimination cases discussed here.
 251. 472 U.S. at 854-55.
 252. Id. at 857.
 253. Id. at 861 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[the regulations] do not, by their terms, prohibit the
 consideration of race or national origin"). Interestingly, Justice Marshall's dissent focused almost entirely
 on national origin discrimination, which he seemed to regard as sufficient to undermine the majority's posi-
 tion. See, e.g., id. at 864 ("[Tihe Court's conclusion that, aside from constitutional constraints, the parole
 regulations prohibit national-origin distinctions draws no support from anything in the regulations themselves
 or in the statutory and administrative background to those regulations."). In a footnote, he observed without
 explanation that "the analysis would be different for race discrimination." Id. at 859 n. 1. In fact, the statute
 and regulations address neither race nor national origin discrimination. I intend my analysis of Jean as a
 phantom norm decision to include both race and national origin, but the analysis would remain valid even
 based on only one of the two.
 The statute makes parole highly discretionary. See id. at 863 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ('These
 regulations indicate that the INS believes that nationality-based distinctions are not necessarily inconsistent
 with congressional delegation of 'discretion' over immigration decisions to the Executive. That interpretation
 of the statutes is, of course, entitled to deference.") (citing Chevron); see also id. at 865; cf. Haitian Refugee
 Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 453 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (congressional conclusion that discrimination
 in immigration law is "improper" is evident in INA ? 202(a), 8 U.S.C. ? 1152(a): "No person shall receive
 any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of his
 race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence ...."), aff'd as modified sub nom. Haitian
 Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
 The rest of Marshall's dissent addressed the constitutional issue directly. 472 U.S. at 868-81 (aliens
 have constitutional right to parole decisions free of race or national origin discrimination) (citing Yick Wo,
 Wong Wing, Russian Volunteer Fleet, Diaz, and Plyler); see also id. at 877-79 (granting parole to aliens,
 at least while decision on their excludability is pending, differs from admitting them).
 254. See Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 998; Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d at 1483-85; Jean v. Nelson,
 727 F.2d at 967-75.
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 It is striking that the racial equality aspect of this norm was the same norm
 that had influenced the Court's interpretation of the tax exemption statute in
 Bob Jones.255 Both Bob Jones and Jean arose because the agency had to
 decide whether, in enforcing the statute, to apply a racial equality norm that
 Congress had not expressly specified. In Bob Jones, the racial equality norm
 was real, but in Jean it was phantom; the Court has never held an immigration
 classification unconstitutional on the ground that it discriminates on the basis
 of race or national origin.
 2. Indefinite Detention of Mariel Cubans
 Another group of phantom norm cases involves Mariel Cubans, about
 125,000 of whom came to the United States from Cuba between April and
 October 1980. While many were excludable, the Cuban government would not
 take them back, and the United States government then placed many in indefi-
 nite detention.256 In Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,257 one detainee
 sought release on parole, claiming that continued indefinite detention was cruel
 and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment and a violation
 of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. In 1980, the district court
 found that the petitioner could not claim rights under the Fifth or Eighth
 Amendments, and that denying parole offended no statute, but that such a
 denial nonetheless constituted an abuse of discretion because it violated interna-
 tional law principles forbidding arbitrary detention.258
 In 1981, a Tenth Circuit panel affirmed on the subconstitutional ground that
 the INS lacked statutory authority for indefinite detention.259 But the heart
 of the opinion's reasoning was dictum, based on a phantom norm of Fifth and
 Eighth Amendment protections for detained would-be entrants that would render
 indefinite detention of these excludable Cubans unconstitutional punish-
 ment.260 The panel conceded that the plenary power cases, especially Mezei,
 255. Bob Jones is discussed supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
 256. For background, see 52 Fed. Reg.48,799-802 (1987); Note, Legal Fictions Mask Human Suffering:
 The Detention of the Mariel Cubans-Constitutional, Statutory, International Law, and Human Con-
 siderations, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1733, 1735-43 (1989). Under the Cuban Review Plan adopted on May 25,
 1987, Mariel Cubans still in custody receive an annual INS interview to determine whether they will be
 released on parole. The detainees must show that they are nonviolent and likely to remain so, not likely
 to commit future crimes, do not pose a danger to the community, and are not likely to violate parole con-
 ditions. See 8 C.F.R. ? 212.12 (1990). After prison riots in Atlanta, Georgia, and Oakdale, Louisiana, in
 November 1987, the government agreed that Cubans in custody at that time also would receive a one-time
 written review by a special Department of Justice panel (from which INS personnel are excluded) if they
 were denied parole by the INS. See 8 C.F.R. ? 212.13 (1990).
 257. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez
 v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
 258. 505 F. Supp. at 790-800.
 259. 654 F.2d at 1389-90 (construing INA ? 233, 8 U.S.C. ? 1223(b), repealed by ? 206, Act of Oct.
 30, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341-56).
 260. 654 F.2d at 1386 ("We dispose of the appeal by construing the applicable statutes to require Rodri-
 guez-Fernandez' release at this time. Nevertheless, it seems important to discuss the serious constitutional
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 normally insulate exclusion decisions from constitutional challenges, but it
 concluded that indefinite detention was not just incident to exclusion, and
 instead that it closely resembled criminal punishment.261 This analysis relied
 on Yick Wo and four of its most prominent progeny-Wong Wing, Russian
 Volunteer Fleet, Mow Sun Wong, and Graham.262 The panel distinguished
 Mezei in four ways: it focused on denial of a hearing, it involved national
 security considerations, it involved confinement under less harsh conditions,
 and it raised a claim of not only parole but also admission.263
 The court based its subconstitutional decision on constitutional reasoning.
 The opinion offered a questionable interpretation of the statute264 and resulted
 in a surreal order that the INS release an excludable alien, but not necessarily
 within the United States. The court offered this reading with little discussion,
 but observed that the reading was consistent with the court's constitutional
 analysis.265 In Diaz v. Haig,266 the federal district court in Wyoming fol-
 lowed Rodriguez-Fernandez and relied on Yick Wo and Wong Wing in reaching
 alternative findings that indefinite detention of juvenile Cubans was abuse of
 discretion and a Fifth Amendment due process violation.267 Other cases have
 reached similar subconstitutional holdings, though the extent to which they
 relied on constitutional reasoning varies.268 That the subconstitutional analysis
 questions involved if the statute were construed differently.").
 261. Id. at 1385-86.
 262. Id. at 1386-87. These cases are discussed supra text accompanying notes 95-100, 194-209.
 263. Id. at 1388. The focus on denial of a hearing in Mezei was indeed a difference between the facts
 in Mezei and Chew, but one that would seem to strengthen it as a barrier against the Cubans' claims in
 Rodriguez-Fernandez.
 264. For a critique of the court's interpretation of the statute, see Note, Statutory and Constitutional
 Limitations on the Indefinite Detention of Excludable Aliens, 62 B.U.L. REV. 553, 570-79 (1982).
 265. 654 F.2d at 1390.
 266. 594 F. Supp. 1 (D. Wyo. 1981).
 267. Id. at 5-6 (abuse of discretion), 7-8 (due process).
 268. See Moret v. Karn, 746 F.2d 989, 992 (3d Cir. 1984) (abuse of discretion to deny parole without
 dangerousness finding required by INS internal procedures); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 557 F. Supp. 690,
 696 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (some sponsorship practices were abuse of discretion; other parole-related policies
 are not), rev'd, 734 F.2d 576, 583 (11th Cir. 1984) (applying same abuse of discretion test but reaching
 opposite result); Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049, 1057-61 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (abuse of
 discretion for INS to revoke parole); cf. Gutierrez v. fichert, 702 F. Supp. 787, 789-94 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
 (denial of parole to IRCA legalization applicant lacks facially legitimate and bona fide reason); Gutierrez
 v. fichert, 682 F. Supp. 467, 471-72 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (denial of parole to IRCA legalization applicant is
 abuse of discretion and lacks facially legitimate and bona fide reason). See generally Note, supra note 256.
 But cf. Perez-Perez v. Hanberry, 781 F.2d 1477, 1481-82 (11th Cir. 1986) (broad discretion to grant or deny
 parole); Sidney v. Howerton, 777 F.2d 1490, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985) (vacating district court order to parole
 alien during pendency of habeas corpus petition); Note, Indefinite Detention of Excluded Aliens: Statutory
 and Constitutional Justifications and Limitations, 82 MICH. L. REV. 61, 65-76 (1983) (statute allows
 detention instead of parole).
 At least one court relied on international law. A gravitational pull on statutes may be exercised by
 international law norms, which, like phantom constitutional norms, are inconsistent with prevailing constitu-
 tional law. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795-800 (D. Kan. 1980), affd on other
 grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (1Oth Cir. 1981); Eskridge, supra note
 74, at 1026-28. But see Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 16 n.10 (1st Cir. 1987); Singh v. Nelson, 623
 F. Supp. 545, 552-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115, 1122 n.2 (N.D. Ga.
 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984); Femandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp.
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 in these cases rested on a phantom norm is evident not only from Mezei itself,
 but also from other appellate decisions that have consistently rejected Fifth and
 Eighth Amendment protections for indefinitely detained Cubans. For example,
 in Fernandez-Roque v. Smith269 an Eleventh Circuit panel squarely reversed
 a district court decision that started its analysis with Yick Wo and ended by
 adopting reasoning similar to the constitutional dictum in Rodriguez-Fer-
 nandez.270 Relying heavily on the en banc decision in Jean v. Nelson,271
 the panel followed Mezei in holding that decisions regarding release from
 detention on parole are within the political branches' plenary power because
 they are part of the admissions process.272
 3. Asylum Procedures for Excludable First-Time Entrants
 Several recent lower court cases on procedures for deciding asylum applica-
 tions by excludable first-time entrants are probably subconstitutional decisions
 guided by phantom constitutional norms. In Chun v. Sava,273 decided in 1983,
 a Second Circuit panel interpreted the asylum statutes and regulations to require
 the INS to grant stowaways an exclusion hearing at which they could raise
 asylum claims. Augustin v. Sava,274 a 1984 Second Circuit panel decision,
 interpreted the asylum statutes and regulations to require adequate translations.
 Both interpretations relied heavily on a constitutional norm of due process for
 excludable first-time entrants seeking asylum, and in particular on the view that
 the scheme for granting political asylum creates a constitutionally protectable
 liberty or property interest that brings asylum applicants within the procedural
 due process framework set out in Goldberg v. Kelly,275 Mathews v.
 Eldridge,76 and their progeny. Chun's subconstitutional analysis relied heavi-
 887, 901-04 (N.D. Ga. 1985), ajf'd in pertinent part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Garcia-Mir
 v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-55 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 888 (1987); Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 627
 F. Supp. 13, 17-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). On international law as it applies to exclusion, see Nafziger, The
 General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (1983).
 269. 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'g 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
 270. See 567 F. Supp. at 1125-29 (detention was not merely incident to exclusion, and judicially
 ordered parole was provisional procedural remedy separate from substantive admission decisions).
 271. 727 F.2d 957 (1lth Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd as modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), discussed supra
 text accompanying notes 237-55.
 272. Fernandez-Roque, 734 F.2d at 581-82; see also Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215 ("such temporary harbor-
 age, an act of legislative grace, bestows no additional rights"); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 533 (1952)
 ("Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure."); Amanullah, 811 F.2d at 9-11; Garcia-Mir
 v. Meese, 766 F.2d 1478, 1484 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1022 (1986); Palma v. Verdeyen,
 676 F.2d 100, 103-05 (4th Cir. 1982); Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 790. See generally Schuck, supra note
 6, at 71 ("As a practical matter, this ostensibly procedural decision amounts to granting a substantive right
 to remain in this country indefinitely to many aliens who are clearly excludable under our laws.") (emphasis
 in original); id. at 30 (classical immigration law treated exclusion and detention alike); id. at 28-30, 68-72
 (detention power is key to classical immigration law).
 273. 708 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983).
 274. 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984).
 275. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
 276. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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 ly on "the dictates of procedural due process" and the presence of a constitu-
 tionally "protectable interest."277 Similarly, Augustin cited Mathews v. Diaz
 for the proposition that "an alien who is present in the United States, even
 illegally, is entitled to constitutional protections."278 It then noted that its
 interpretation of the statute and regulations may very likely be the constitutional
 due process minimum, because of asylum applicants' "constitutionally protected
 liberty or property interests."279
 The constitutional norm of due process for excludable first-time entrants
 seeking asylum was probably a phantom. Plasencia embraced the Mathews v.
 Eldridge procedural due process analysis, but only for returning permanent
 residents.280 Lower courts have imposed some modest procedural due process
 requirements in asylum cases, but for deportable rather than excludable
 aliens.28' The Eleventh Circuit's 1982 panel decision in Haitian Refugee
 277. 708 F.2d at 876 ("our construction of the statute is aided to some extent, if not guided, by what
 we perceive to be the dictates of procedural due process"); id. at 877 & n.25 ("refugee who has a 'well-
 founded fear of persecution' in his homeland has a protectable interest recognized by both treaty and statute,
 and his interest in not being returned may well enjoy some due process protection not available to an alien
 claiming only admission").
 278. 735 F.2d at 36.
 279. Id. at 37; see also id. ("procedural protections may well be required not only by the pertinent
 statutes and regulations but also by the due process clause"); id. ("likely that some due process protection
 surrounds the determination of whether an alien has sufficiently shown that return to a particular country
 will jeopardize his life or freedom"); id. at 38 ("appellant was denied procedural rights protected by statute
 and INS regulations and very likely by due process as well"). Justice Marshall's dissent in Jean noted that
 "the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has suggested that unadmitted aliens can invoke the protections
 of the Constitution." 472 U.S. at 868 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Augustin and Chun).
 280. See 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). Plasencia is discussed in greater detail supra text accompanying notes
 175-81.
 281. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1506-08 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (under Constitution
 and Eldridge analysis, government must give notice of right to apply for asylum); id. at 1509-11 (govern-
 ment may not interfere with access to retained counsel in asylum cases); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541
 F. Supp. 351, 374-78, 380-82 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (similar). The court recently found that the INS failed to
 comply with a permanent injunction ordering better access to legal services. Orantes-Hernandez v.
 Thornburgh, CV 82-1107 KN (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1989), digested in 66 ITERPRETER RELEASES 1177-78
 (1989); see also Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 583-87 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (identifying the interests as
 "life and liberty," court issued temporary restraining order requiring government to notify detainees of right
 to apply for asylum), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982); cf. Haitian Refugee Center v. Nelson,
 872 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (11th Cir. 1989) ("entitlement interest exists"; Constitution requires certain
 procedures for Special Agricultural Worker legalization), aff'g Haitian Refugee Center v. Nelson, 694
 F. Supp. 864, 878 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("constitutionally protected right to seek SAW status"). See generally
 Note, INS Transfer Policy: Interference With Detained Aliens' Due Process Right to Retain Counsel, 100
 HARV. L. REv. 2001 (1987).
 The Orantes-Hernandez litigation also includes subconstitutional holdings that may reflect a constitu-
 tional due process norm, but for deportable aliens this norm may not be a phantom. See Orantes-Hernandez
 v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1506, 1509 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351,
 374-76 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (similar). But cf. Azzouka v. Sava, 777 F.2d 68, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1985) (statute gives
 no right to asylum hearing if government finds alien is national security risk), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830
 (1986); see also Azzouka v. Sava, 820 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1987). In what may be a similar phantom norm
 decision, a district court held recently that the government's failure to interpret entire deportation and
 exclusion proceedings for non-English speakers violates their statutory rights to be present, examine
 evidence, confront and cross-examine witnesses, as well as their constitutional Fifth Amendment due process
 rights. El Rescate Legal Servs. v. Executive Office of Immigration Review, 727 F. Supp. 557, 560-63 (C.D.
 Cal. 1989); cf. Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270, 1273, 1275-77 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (relying on
 United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to require equal treatment of
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 Center v. Smith"' recognized a constitutionally protected liberty or property
 interest in asylum applicants who are excludable first-time entrants.283 But
 Knauff and Mezei284 either squarely block a finding that a first-time entrant
 applying for asylum has a liberty interest in entry, or compel finding that she
 is entitled only to minimal due process under the Eldridge analysis. In fact, the
 Eleventh Circuit has severely limited Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, if not
 effectively overruled it.285
 4. First Amendment Challenges to Exclusion Grounds
 Another important group of phantom norm cases involves First Amendment
 challenges to exclusion grounds.286 In 1982, for example, a federal district
 excludable and deportable aliens), vacated and remanded without opinion, 566 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978).
 But see Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281, 1287-89 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded to consider
 mootness, 434 U.S. 962 (1977). For a discussion of Sannon and Pierre, see Note, Due Process Rights for
 Excludable Aliens Under United States Immigration Law and the United Nations Protocol Relating to the
 Status of Refugees-I-aitian Aliens, A Case in Point, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 203 (1977).
 282. 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
 283. See id. at 1038 ("constitutionally protected liberty or property interests may have their source in
 positive rules of law, enacted by the state or federal government and creating a substantive entitlement to
 a particular governmental benefit. In this case we conclude that Congress and the executive have created,
 at a minimum, a constitutionally protected right to petition our government for political asylum."), aff'g
 and modifying Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 455 (S.D. Fla. 1980) ("asylum
 applicant who fears to return to his homeland because of persecution has raised the specter of truly severe
 deprivations of life, liberty, and property"). For commentaries adopting this general approach to excludable
 aliens' due process rights, see Martin, supra note 103, at 187; Note, The Right to Appointed Counsel in
 Asylum Proceedings, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1157 (1985); Note, Penetrating the Entry Doctrine: Excludable
 Aliens' Constitutional Rights in Immigration Processes, 98 YALE L.J. 639 (1989). For a much earlier case
 that similarly combined phantom constitutional reasoning with a subconstitutional holding, see United States
 ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610, 613-15 (2d Cir. 1958) ("since a construction of [the statute]
 which requires a hearing on the subject of revocation of parole will remove serious doubt regarding the
 validity of the statute, we so construe the section").
 284. Plasencia limited Mezei, but only with respect to returning permanent residents. See supra text
 accompanying notes 157-81.
 285. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 981-83 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (no liberty or property interest
 in asylum; neither due process nor statute/regulations requires notice of right to seek asylum), rev'g 711
 F.2d 1455, 1507-08 (11th Cir. 1983) (aliens in exclusion must be notified of right to seek asylum), aff'd
 as modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); cj: Ukrainian-American Bar Ass'n v. Baker, 893 F.2d 1374, 1380-82
 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (government need not tell asylum applicants of offer of free legal advice); Perez-Perez
 v. Hanberry, 781 F.2d 1477, 1479-81 (1lth Cir. 1986) (statute does not authorize appointed counsel in
 habeas corpus action attacking parole denial); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1449-53 (1lth Cir.
 1986), (indefinitely detained Cubans have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole), cert.
 denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 582 (11th Cir. 1984) (same, citing
 11th Circuit en banc opinion in Jean); Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 944-47 (5th Cir. 1984) (even
 assuming that deportation asylum applicant has protectable liberty interest, due process does not require
 notice of asylum); Avila v. Rivkind, 724 F. Supp. 945, 947-48 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (alien seeking admission
 "is requesting a privilege, and has extremely limited constitutional protection"; Attorney General may
 exclude without further hearing an alien previously convicted for terrorist activities as security risk under
 INA ? 235(c)); Note, Protecting Aliens From Persecution Without Overloading the INS: Should Illegal
 Aliens Receive Notice of the Right to Apply for Asylum?, 69 VA. L. REV. 901, 908-13 (1983) (even if
 immigration laws create liberty interest in asylum applicant, no due process right to notice of asylum).
 286. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), an
 important recent case sustaining a First Amendment challenge to ideological deportation grounds, is
 discussed infra text accompanying notes 352-57.
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 court in LesbianlGay Freedom Day Committee v. INS287 barred the govern-
 ment from enforcing the "psychopathic personality" statutory exclusion ground
 against homosexuals.288 The opinion relied largely on constitutional analysis,
 specifically a norm of First Amendment limits on government enforcement of
 the immigration statutes. The court found that because medical authorities no
 longer considered homosexuality per se to be a mental disorder, applying this
 exclusion ground to homosexuals was unconstitutional under the First Amend-
 ment and Mandel's "facially legitimate and bona fide" test.289 But Mandel
 itself tells us that the district court in LesbianlGay Freedom Day Committee
 relied on a phantom norm. There, the Supreme Court dismissed a First Amend-
 ment claim by finding that the government had given a "facially legitimate and
 bona fide reason," without background inquiry of the sort in LesbianlGay
 Freedom Day Committee.290 The only other federal court of appeals to consid-
 er a similar constitutional challenge upheld enforcement.291 And because of
 the Supreme Court decision in Boutilier v. INS,292 any constitutional challenge
 on vagueness grounds would be no less based on phantom norm reasoning.
 LesbianlGay Freedom Day Committee merits description as a
 subconstitutional decision based on a phantom constitutional norm, because its
 constitutional reasoning also provided the basis for its alternative subconstitutio-
 nal holding-that enforcement of the "psychopathic personality" exclusion
 ground against homosexuals was an abuse of discretion because it was inconsis-
 tent with the statute.293 By transplanting the "facially legitimate and bona fide
 reason" test to subconstitutional ground, using it to ask if government action
 was "beyond the scope of delegated powers" or an "abuse of discretion," the
 court expressed its constitutional views in a much less audacious form and gave
 new, subconstitutional life to First Amendment challenges. Indeed, the Ninth
 Circuit affirmed on the statutory ground without reaching the constitutional
 issue.294
 Several similar decisions involve First Amendment challenges to govern-
 ment decisions to exclude aliens on openly ideological grounds, as authorized
 287. 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd only on statutory ground sub nom. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d
 1470, 1481 (9th Cir. 1983).
 288. INA ? 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. ? 1182(a)(4) (1988), discussed supra text accompanying notes 158-73
 in connection with Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
 289. 541 F. Supp. at 585-88.
 290. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), is discussed in greater detail supra text accompanying
 notes 182-87.
 291. Matter of Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1442-43, 1450 n.56 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
 1219 (1984).
 292. 387 U.S. 118 (1967), discussed supra text accompanying note 172 in connection with Rosenberg
 v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
 293. 541 F. Supp. at 580; see also Note, The Immigration and Nationality Act and the Exclusion of
 Homosexuals: Boutilier v. INS Revisited, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 359 (1981). But cf. Matter of Longstaff, 716
 F.2d 1439, 1445-51 (5th Cir. 1983) (no subconstitutional problem with enforcement of exclusion ground
 against homosexuals), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984).
 294. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1481 (9th Cir. 1983).
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 by statute.295 Allende v. Shultz,296 a 1985 district court case, challenged de-
 nial of a nonimmigrant visa to Hortensia Allende, widow of former Chilean
 President Salvador Allende. Allende resembles LesbianlGay Freedom Day
 Committee in that it also turned Mandel's "facially legitimate and bona fide
 reason" test for constitutional challenges into a subconstitutional reason to deny
 the government's motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment.
 According to the court, "the explanation given must be 'facially legitimate and
 bona fide' not only in a general sense, but also within the context of the
 specific statutory provision on which the exclusion is based."297 A later opin-
 ion in the same case reached the same conclusion after considering new evi-
 dence, and suggested strongly that its holding on both occasions was a matter
 of statutory interpretation.298 El-Werfalli v. Smith,299 a 1982 district court
 decision, is similar in reasoning though not result. The court applied the
 "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" test as part of an analysis that
 probably was subconstitutional, in that it measured whether the stated reason
 conformed to the exclusion ground as set forth in the statute. The court tenta-
 tively found that the government "arguably fail[ed] to establish a reasoned basis
 for action," but then later found for the government after in camera inspection
 of classified material.300
 Abourezk v. Reagan,301 the only recent federal appellate decision involving
 a First Amendment challenge to ideological exclusion, may also be an example
 of phantom norm decisionmaking. Without clearly separating its constitutional
 and subconstitutional analyses,302 the district court first interpreted the statute
 295. See INA ? 212(a)(27), (28), (29), 8 U.S.C. ? 1182(a)(27), (28), (29) (1988).
 296. 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Mass. 1985), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988).
 297. 605 F. Supp. at 1224, aff'd, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988); cf. Gutierrez v. Ilchert, 702 F. Supp.
 787, 789-95 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (denial of parole to IRCA legalization applicant lacks facially legitimate and
 bona fide reason); Gutierrez v. Ilchert, 682 F. Supp. 467,471-72 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (denial of parole to IRCA
 legalization applicant is abuse of discretion and lacks facially legitimate and bona fide reason). But cf.
 Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204,210-13 (2d Cir. 1982) ("facially legitimate and bona fide reason," not abuse
 of discretion test, applies to attack on parole denial as impermissibly based on race and/or national origin).
 298. See Allende v. Shultz, No. 83-3984-C, slip op. at 7 1987 LEXIS 2798, 15 (D. Mass. Mar. 31,
 1987) ("This Court [earlier] ruled that under subsection 27, Mrs. Allende's mere membership in [certain
 communist organizations] was an insufficient reason for the denial of her visa application."); see also id.
 at 16 ('There is thus no lawful basis for defendants, proceeding under subsection 27."). In February 1990,
 Pub. L. No. 101-246, ? 128, 104 Stat. 15, made permanent ? 901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization
 Act, Pub. L. No. 100-204, which barred the government from deporting, excluding, or denying visas to
 nonimmigrants because of past or current political beliefs, statements or associations which, if engaged in
 by a citizen in this country, would be protected by the Constitution. Section 128 also makes it clear that
 entry by nonimmigrants protected under ? 901 cannot be subject to conditions or restrictions.
 299. 547 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
 300. Id. at 154. The Allende opinion, 605 F. Supp. at 1224, aff d, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988), cited
 El-Werfalli; see also NGO Comm. on Disarmament v. Haig, No. 82 Civ. 3636, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. June 10,
 1982), affd mem., 697 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1982).
 301. 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C.
 Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987).
 302. See 592 F. Supp. at 884 n. 11 (plaintiffs' arguments that statute either does not permit exclusion
 or if it does is unconstitutional "do not differ materially, and ... therefore will be considered together").
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 to permit the visa refusals in question.303 It then acknowledged the seriousness
 of the First Amendment challenge, but rejected it after in camera inspection
 of classified material.3" A District of Columbia Circuit panel reversed on the
 ground that the record in the district court had been inadequate to support its
 interpretation of the statute.305 It remanded the case, avoiding the constitution-
 al issue altogether.306 The district court then resolved the case by interpreting
 the statute as not authorizing the exclusions.307 It may be fair to analyze the
 combined result of these two decisions as judicial review of visa refusals
 through narrow interpretation of the statutory exclusion grounds, based on a
 phantom norm of First Amendment limits on government enforcement of the
 immigration statutes.
 IV. IN SEARCH OF CONSTITUTIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW
 In spite of the Court's reluctance to provide guidance in Jean v. Nelson,
 or perhaps because of it, public debate about plenary power will intensify rather
 than abate. One problem with this debate is that it has focused almost exclu-
 sively on the doctrine's most immediate and obvious consequences, asking
 simply if it is fair or necessary to keep immigration law outside our system of
 public law. But it is just as important to examine the plenary power doctrine's
 less obvious, systemic effects on immigration law as a whole.
 A. The Problem of Awkward or Unpredictable Subconstitutional Solutions
 Phantom norm decisions have eliminated some troubling results produced
 by the plenary power doctrine; this is why courts have reached them. Courts
 that find acceptable subconstitutional solutions for individual cases will adopt
 them. Yet a subconstitutional decision can be a very awkward way to express
 a phantom constitutional norm, because statutes and other subconstitutional texts
 provide judges with limited interpretive possibilities. These might suffice to
 prevent injustice in a particular case but do little to find a coherent and fully
 satisfactory solution if the particular injustice is merely symptomatic of a more
 fundamental problem that is rooted in the alien's inability, attributable to the
 plenary power doctrine, to raise a constitutional claim directly.308
 303. 592 F. Supp. at 884-86. The exclusion ground principally at issue was INA ? 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C.
 ? 1182(a)(27) (1988); also important was the relationship between this ground and INA ? 212(a)(28), 8
 U.S.C. ? 1182(a)(28) (1988).
 304. 592 F. Supp. at 886-88.
 305. 785 F.2d at 1053-60.
 306. Id. at 1060 n.24; cf. id. at 1075-76 (Bork, J., dissenting) (Mandel lets government exclude based
 on content of political beliefs as constitutional matter).
 307. Abourezk v. Reagan, Nos. 83-3739, 83-3741, 83-3895 1988 LEXIS 5203, 15-17 (D.D.C. June
 7, 1988).
 308. Legislative options are more promising. Congressman Mazzoli offered legislation in recent sessions
 that would have amended the INA to recognize a returning resident's ties to the United States, much as
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 Awkwardness includes both overbreadth and underinclusiveness. Fong Haw
 Tan309 illustrates the former. Concern for permanent residents prompted the
 Court to adopt a generous rule of construction that has been applied to all
 deportation cases.310 Both underinclusiveness and overbreadth are evident in
 Fleuti,2 which created an exception to the reentry doctrine because the stat-
 ute failed to reflect a returning permanent resident's "stake." Fleuti's subconsti-
 tutional solution is underinclusive in that many permanent residents, like Maria
 Plasencia, have significant equities based on ties to this country, but do not
 benefit from Fleuti. Their problems required the direct constitutional solution
 in Landon v. Plasencia.312 Fleuti is also overinclusive; at least one court has
 applied it to help nonimmigrants.313 Underinclusiveness means some of the
 problem remains unsolved. Overbreadth represents waste; courts may compen-
 sate for the overbroad generosity of Fong Haw Tan, Fleuti, and similar deci-
 sions with a more begrudging attitude toward permanent residents on other
 issues, both constitutional and subconstitutional.
 A related problem is unpredictability. The problem arises because some-
 times, in Fleuti for example, a subconstitutional decision can incorporate a
 phantom constitutional norm only by going beyond reasonable readings of a
 subconstitutional text. Phantom norm decisionmaking may help some aliens
 when a case evokes sympathy, but we cannot predict those situations. The
 Supreme Court's 1984 decision in INS v. Phinpathya314 illustrates the prob-
 lem. The Attorney General has discretion to suspend deportation and confer
 permanent residency on an otherwise deportable alien of "good moral charac-
 ter" who "has been physically present in the United States for a continuous
 period of not less than seven years," if deportation would result in "extreme
 hardship" to the alien or his spouse, parent, or child.315 Applying Fleuti by
 analogy, some lower courts disregarded "innocent, casual, and brief"316 ab-
 happens in constitutional immigration law after Plasencia. H.R. 4823, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. ? 101 (1986).
 This bill passed the House, but the Senate did not act on it. 132 CONG. REC. H8570 (1986). Mazzoli intro-
 duced virtually the same measure the next term, see H.R. 2921, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Another
 option is to eliminate the concept of "entry" altogether. See T. ALEINIKoFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 15,
 at 342-47; Martin, supra note 188, at 806-07. This would mean that a unitary type of immigration hearing
 would test an alien's claim to be in the United States, in effect combining the statutory deportation and
 exclusion categories for most but not necessarily all purposes.
 309. 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
 310. See, e.g., Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 n.19 (1966) ("This standard of proof applies to all
 deportation cases, regardless of the length of time the alien has resided in this country."); Squires v. INS,
 689 F.2d 1276, 1280 (6th Cir. 1982); D. MARTIN, supra note 9, at 19 (Supreme Court applies "most lenient
 interpretation to ambiguous statutes or regulations, particularly in deportation cases, in light of the high
 stakes involved for the alien.").
 311. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), discussed supra text accompanying notes 158-73.
 312. 459 U.S. 21 (1982), discussed supra text accompanying notes 175-81.
 313. See Joshi v. INS, 720 F.2d 799, 800-02 (4th Cir. 1983). The Board of Immigration Appeals has
 refused to apply Fleuti except in cases involving returning permanent residents. See Matter of Torres, It.
 Dec. 3010 (BIA 1986); Matter of Mundell, 18 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1983).
 314. 464 U.S. 183 (1984).
 315. INA ? 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. ? 1254(a)(1) (1988).
 316. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 461.
This content downloaded from 
             143.229.43.66 on Wed, 18 Nov 2020 16:25:59 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 602 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 100: 545
 sences for purposes of the seven-year continuous physical presence require-
 ment.317 Phinpathya struck down this practice as contrary to the statute's plain
 meaning, rejecting the aliens' principal argument, that suspension, like the
 Fleuti exception, was meant to be "equitable and ameliorative.""38 But the
 lower courts' broad view of continuous physical presence was no more contrary
 to plain meaning than the Court's own reading of "entry" in Fleuti, which the
 Court reached in spite of evidence that Congress tried to limit exceptions to
 the reentry doctrine. In fact, Phinpathya read "continuous physical presence"
 narrowly in spite of evidence that Congress wanted a broader reading.319
 One possible explanation for Phinpathya-though Justice O'Connor deemed
 it "not essential" to the decision-lies in her contrasting characterizations of
 Fleuti as a "lawful resident alien" and Phinpathya as "an unlawful alien who
 could have been deported even had she remained in this country."320 But
 these are just conclusory labels, and it is difficult to know how courts, in
 interpreting statutes, should distinguish between the Fleutis and the Phinpathyas
 of immigration law.321 It is difficult to know when to adhere strictly to a
 statute's "plain meaning" in spite of a harsh result, and when to take greater
 interpretive liberties to reflect a phantom constitutional norm, for example, that
 certain hardships should not be visited on some aliens with ties to this country.
 We should be troubled when the range of possible "reasonable" readings of a
 statute broadens to the point that little will surprise us.
 As judges become more willing and able to address constitutional issues
 directly, rather than through subconstitutional reasoning, they should find that
 they do not need to grope for these awkward and unpredictable
 subconstitutional solutions. Similarly, Fleuti and the strain that it placed on the
 statute are needed less now than in 1963, thanks to Plasencia's expansion of
 judicial review to include openly constitutional due process challenges to
 exclusion procedures.
 317. See, e.g., Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 183, 193
 (1984); Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1979); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812,
 815-17 (9th Cir. 1964).
 318. 464 U.S. at 192-96.
 319. Id. at 196-205 (Brennan, J., concurring). According to the majority, Congress thought that the
 definition of "entry" was too broad while the "continuous physical presence" requirement was intended
 "specifically to limit the discretionary availability of the suspension remedy." Id. at 193. Indeed, Congress
 wasted little time after Phinpathya to enact legislation that abrogated its result. Immigration Reform and
 Control Act ? 315(b), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), amended NA ? 244, 8 U.S.C.
 ? 1254(b)(2), to exclude "brief, casual, and innocent" absences that "did not meaningfully interrupt"
 continuous physical presence.
 320. 464 U.S. at 194 (emphases in original). She added, suchuh an alien has no basis for expecting
 the Government to permit her to remain in the United States or to readmit her upon her return from foreign
 soil." Id. Her comment that this difference was "not essential" to the Court's decision, id., suggests that
 the distinction had some effect.
 321. See also Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794,797-98 (3d Cir. 1980); cf. INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85, 88-91
 (1986) (per curiam), which reversed, as contrary to the statute's "plain meaning," a court of appeals decision
 that had considered hardship to two nieces in determining extreme hardship for suspension of deportation
 under NA ? 244(a)(1),8 U.S.C. ? 1101(b)(2) (1988), because theirrelationships were functionally indistinct
 from a parent-child relationship.
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 The District of Columbia Circuit's 1988 decision in Rafeedie v. INS322
 illustrates this shift nicely. The INS tried to exclude Rafeedie, a permanent
 resident and allegedly a high-ranking member of a Palestinian terrorist group,
 without a hearing under the summary exclusion statute when he tried to enter
 the country after a trip overseas.323 Rafeedie argued that that statute did not
 apply to permanent residents, and alternatively that the denial of a hearing
 resulting from its application violated due process. The district court rejected
 the statutory argument but found that the due process concerns were serious
 enough to merit a preliminary injunction barring summary exclusion,325 and
 the appeals court affirmed the grant of the injunction.326
 In Rafeedie, a subconstitutional decision based on a phantom constitutional
 norm was unnecessary because Plasencia had recognized a returning permanent
 resident's due process rights as a constitutional matter' Both the district and the
 appeals courts addressed the constitutional issue directly without having to
 squeeze Rafeedie through the Fleuti loophole.327 In fact, the appeals court
 held that Fleuti's "meaningfully interruptive absence" test for statutory "reen-
 try" would not decide if a returning permanent resident could claim procedural
 due process, even though some of the same factors would count.328 What
 might have been a phantom norm decision before Plasencia instead became a
 candid application of constitutional doctrine.
 With such changes in constitutional immigration law giving judges new
 freedom to address constitutional claims directly, it seems less objectionable
 when a court breaks the Fong Haw Tan rule, which is the least precise
 subconstitutional solution, by refusing to read deportation statutes in favor of
 aliens in Phinpathya and similar cases.329 Nonetheless, a systemic problem
 with phantom norm decisionmaking is that even if these awkward or unpre-
 dictable solutions are needed less now than before, they remain with us after
 the transition from phantom to real is complete.
 322. 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
 323. This, the INS argued, made him excludable under NA ?? 212(a)(27), (28)(F), 8 U.S.C.
 ?? 1182(a)(27), (28)(F) (1988). It sought to exclude him without a hearing under INA ? 235(c), 8 U.S.C.
 ? 1225(c) (1988).
 324. 688 F. Supp. 729, 742-43 (D.D.C. 1988).
 325. Id. at 743-51.
 326. 880 F.2d at 519.
 327. See 688 F. Supp. at 743 ("Plaintiff's real quarrel with Section 235(a) is a constitutional, not a
 statutory, one.").
 328. 880 F.2d at 521-24.
 329. See, e.g., INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 451 (1985); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984); INS
 v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1981) (per curiam) (overturning liberal construction of "extreme
 hardship" because "the Act commits their definition [of "extreme hardship"] in the first instance to the
 Attorney General and his delegates, and their construction and application of this standard should not be
 overturned by a reviewing court simply because it may prefer another interpretation of the statute.").
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 B. The Problem of Misdirected Judicial Review
 Apart from awkwardness or unpredictability, subconstitutional phantom
 norm decisions, once established in response to problems of constitutional
 dimensions, set a precedent for excessive review of routine matters. By "exces-
 sive," I do not necessarily suggest "more" or "less" judicial review; explicit
 adoption of constitutional norms certainly would invite judicial scrutiny of
 agency decisions. Rather, I mean "excessive" in that the judicial habit of review
 not tied to real constitutional norms is open-ended and unbounded. As a result,
 courts may be least likely to intervene in agency decisionmaking when they can
 help most, and most likely to intervene when they can help least. The problem
 goes back as far as Fong Haw Tan, which by calling for interpretation of
 deportation statutes in the light most favorable to the alien, often asks courts
 to limit deference to agency interpretation of statutes. Much more recently, Jean
 v. Nelson330 derived limits on INS discretion in parole decisions from phan-
 tom constitutional considerations, when the subconstitutional texts contained
 no express limitations.
 Under a narrow reading of Jean, the INS abuses its parole discretion331
 if it considers factors that conflict with phantom constitutional norms, whether
 or not a court would squarely hold unconstitutional a statute that expressly
 made those factors pertinent.332 Thus, it is an abuse of discretion to consider
 race in parole decisions, even if it is not directly unconstitutional. But it is
 difficult to avoid slipping into a slightly broader reading of Jean, especially (but
 not only) the reading that the INS abuses its discretion by considering factors
 not expressly authorized by statute or regulation. This reading is entirely
 understandable, since the prevailing view of Jean has not been to analyze it as
 a "phantom norm decision." Such a phantom norm analysis of Jean might help
 contain judicial review of agency action, but unless Jean is so limited, this
 slightly broader reading creates an open-ended and therefore troubling precedent
 for excessive judicial intrusion into agency decisionmaking. As Justice Marshall
 wrote in his dissent in Jean: "The Court's restrictive view of the Attorney
 General's discretionary authority with respect to parole decisions, adopted in
 the face of no authoritative statements limiting such discretion, will presumably
 affect the scope of his permissible discretion in areas other than parole deci-
 330. 472 U.S. 846 (1985), discussed more fully supra text accompanying notes 237-55.
 331. INA ? 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. ? 1182(d)(5) (1988).
 332. As Deborah Anker has suggested, the holding in Jean could have an even narrower meaning, that
 courts limit an agency's discretion when its conduct shows it to be unworthy of judicial deference. See
 Anker, supra note 9, at 11. This might apply to the INS in general, and to its treatment of Haitian asylum
 applicants in particular. But, as Anker points out, the opinion did not rely on these factors. Rather than
 assume that the INS mistreated Haitians, the Court remanded to the district court to find if the INS had
 discriminated against Haitians at all. Jean might also mean that the INS may not consider factors not reason-
 ably related to the discretionary relief sought, in this case parole, but national origin seems closely related
 to a decision to grant or deny parole in a pending asylum case, if only with regard to likelihood of success
 on the application.
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 sions.... This is indeed a costly way to avoid deciding constitutional
 issues."333
 INS v. Rios-Pineda,334 decided by the Court just six weeks before it decid-
 ed Jean, reflects the more typical framework for judicial review of agency deci-
 sions. The Court said that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny certain
 motions to reopen suspension of deportation proceedings. The Court also
 emphasized that agencies must be free to base decisions on factors that relate
 generally to the law entrusted to it-in this case, "legitimate concerns about
 administration of the immigration laws."335 These aspects of Rios-Pineda
 merely continued a tradition of judicial decisions that had established broad
 discretion for the INS.336 Two prominent examples are United States ex rel.
 Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy337 and Jay v. Boyd,338 both of which involved
 the discretionary denial of aliens' requests for suspension of deportation. INS
 v. Abudu, a 1988 Supreme Court decision, adopts a similar approach,339 as
 have numerous lower court decisions.34
 333. 472 U.S. at 867-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 985-86 (11th Cir.
 1984) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (court may review agency action by
 Attorney General or by lower level officials to see if it is outside agency discretion, but it is impractical
 for court to ask if lower level officials' acts were consistent with internal agency directives), aff'd as
 modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). If Judge Tjoflat is correct, fear of constitutional questions may make INS
 operations unduly rigid.
 334. 471 U.S. 444 (1985).
 335. Id. at 451-52.
 336. See generally Anker, supra note 9, at 11.
 337. 353 U.S. 72, 78 (1957) (proper for INS to consider "present-day conditions and congressional
 attitudes" in exercising discretion).
 338. 351 U.S. 345, 358 (1956) (The Court felt "constrained to construe the statute as permitting
 decisions based upon matters outside the administrative record, at least when such action would be reason-
 able.").
 339. 485 U.S. 94, 104-10 (1988). The Court also noted in Jean that the INS enjoys "broad statutory
 discretion" to deny parole. 472 U.S. at 857; cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987)
 (courts decide pure questions of statutory construction).
 340. See, e.g., M.A. v. INS, 899 FR2d 304, 309-10 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc). The Eleventh Circuit
 reached the same conclusion:
 As we stated in Jean, Congress has delegated remarkably broad discretion to executive officials
 under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and these grants of statutory authority are nowhere
 more sweeping than in the context of parole of excludable aliens.. . . After thoroughly exploring
 the broad discretion given the Attorney General in making parole decisions, we concluded [in
 Jean] that a federal court's scope of review in such instances is not the traditional abuse of
 discretion standard, but rather is limited to ascertaining whether he has advanced a 'facially legit-
 imate and bona fide reason' for his decision.
 Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 766 F.2d 1446, 1478 (11th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 766 F.2d 1022,
 cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1022 (1987); accord Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 975-79 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc),
 aff'd as modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (INA "need
 not specifically authorize each and every action taken by the Attorney General, so long as his action is
 reasonably related to the duties imposed upon him."), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980); Hotel & Restaurant
 Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 594 F. Supp. 502, 506 (D.D.C. 1984) (Attorney General has discre-
 tionary power to take actions and to "develop standards, principles and rules" as long as those decisions
 are based upon "considerations rationally related to the statute he is administering.") (quoting Fook Hong
 Mak v. INS, 435 F.2d 728, 730 (2d Cir. 1970)), aff'd in relevant part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
 804 F.2d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided court, 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en
 banc).
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 Courts that get into the habit of using expanded "abuse of discretion" and
 similar subconstitutional constructs to apply phantom constitutional norms
 indirectly are likely to succumb to the temptation to define "legitimate" so
 broadly that they in effect try to run the agency. While this may be under-
 standable in light of the record of the INS,341 judicial review still represents
 the commitment of a precious resource. Review of the wrong type is an uncer-
 tain improvement over no judicial review at all.342 And the problem is com-
 pounded when judicial review is not only misdirected but also imposes cumber-
 some or unworkable procedures.343
 Plenary power has prevented the growth of a coherent constitutional frame-
 work for immigration law, within which its subconstitutional levels-statutes,
 regulations, agency directives, and so forth-can develop and be administered
 fairly and predictably. There is a paradox here. On the one hand, the courts
 adopted the plenary power doctrine to insulate immigration decisions from
 constitutional judicial review. Judicial sensitivity to the need to maintain the
 flexibility to respond to unexpected contingencies, especially pertaining to
 foreign policy, may explain some of the plenary power doctrine's persistence-
 for example, the Supreme Court decided Knauff, Mezei, and Harisiades at the
 height of the nation's preoccupation with the perceived Communist threat. The
 irony is that the steady erosion of the plenary power doctrine through phantom
 norm decisionmaking may, precisely because no coherent body of constitutional
 norms exists to anchor and thus limit judicial review in immigration cases, lead
 to subconstitutional decisions that intrude into executive or legislative opera-
 tions even more aggressively. There may be times when agency decision-
 making, to reach the best results, should be able to apply expertise, discretion,
 341. Cf. Trillin, Making Adjustments, THE NEW YORKER (May 18, 1984) ("[Wlhen people who deal
 regularly with the I.N.S. try to illustrate the depths of its inefficiency and obduracy, they often find
 themselves at a loss for American institutions to compare it with, and turn to foreign examples-the South
 Vietnamese Army, maybe, or the Bolivian Foreign Service.").
 342. See generally Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement,
 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (1972); Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the Informal
 Agency Process, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1972).
 343. See Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A Response to Martin, 44 U. PMTT.
 L. REv. 237, 259 (1983) (problem with plenary power doctrine is that it prevents continuing dialogue
 between courts and Congress on due process, so that when government conduct becomes "outrageous,"
 "courts are forced to leap in with both feet, demanding costly and intrusive procedures that make control
 of the borders and deportation of aliens considerably more difficult."); Martin, supra note 103, at 171
 ("Casting an eye over the procedural exuberance of the lower courts-procedural rulings theoretically appli-
 cable, without discernible limitation, to anyone in the world who presents himself at our borders-may well
 prompt a retreat to something like Knauff-Mezei."); Schuck, supra note 6, at 82-85 (discussing problems
 that could result from "active, intrusive judicial role in immigration cases," among them "ever more for-
 malized, extensive hearing procedures whose effects, apart from increased cost and delays, are uncertain
 and quite possibly perverse"); Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1179-
 82 (1984) (parole-detention cases show that lack of administrative review of informal procedures may lead
 to judicial intervention, which in turn may lead to more procedural formality of discretionary decisions, more
 judicial review, or both).
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 and flexibility after considering the unusual and the unpredictable.3" Since
 Mandel, the most negative effects of phantom norm decisions have been to
 impede the sound exercise of executive branch discretion. Tight supervision
 may correct short-run problems, but in the long run it also prevents immigration
 law from maturing and thus continues its traditional isolation-albeit isolation
 of a different character-from the mainstream of our public law.
 C. The Problem of Dialogue and the Future of Plenary Power
 Awkward or unpredictable solutions and misdirected judicial review are
 symptoms of a more basic condition. Immigration law after a century of plenary
 power has two conflicting sets of constitutional norms. In each of the four areas
 discussed in Part III.B, constitutional immigration law remains tied to the key
 plenary power cases. And the Court has continued to rebuff constitutional
 challenges to substantive, directly legislative choices. The most prominent
 recent case of Fiallo v. Bell,345 decided in 1977, challenged the statute that
 recognized only an illegitimate child and mother, but not the father, as parent
 and child for immigration purposes.346 The Court rejected an equal protection
 attack on two classifications in the statute-gender and legitimacy-that usually
 trigger something more than casual scrutiny.347
 344. The type of case that may raise concerns about excessive judicial review is Hotel & Restaurant
 Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 563 F. Supp. 157 (D.D.C. 1983), 594 F. Supp. 502, 507-09 (D.D.C.
 1984), affd in relevant part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 804 F.2d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd by
 an equally divided court, 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc). The case involved "extended voluntary
 departure," which is the discretionary INS practice of letting some aliens, usually by nationality group, stay
 in the country for humanitarian reasons even though they may lack a meritorious case for political asylum
 or other formal status. The plaintiff union argued that the INS decision to deny extended voluntary departure
 to Salvadorans, while granting it to other nationalities, was "arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of
 discretion." Judge Richey asserted a power of limited judicial review, explaining that "abuse of discretion
 . . . can be shown by demonstrating a violation of constitutional, statutory, regulatory or other legal
 mandates." 563 F. Supp. at 162. Later, he entered summary judgment for the INS, finding no abuse of
 discretion because it had a "facially legitimate" reason for its decision, and the appeals court affirmed. 594
 F. Supp. at 508. Had the Supreme Court already decided Jean, Judge Richey might well have inquired more
 deeply. Cf. American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, No. C 85-3255 FRP (N.D. Cal. 1989), digested in
 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1061-63 (1989) (citing American-Arab to deny government's motions to dismiss
 and for summary judgment where plaintiffs claimed illegal discrimination against Salvadorans and Guatema-
 lans in asylum applications and grants of extended voluntary departure); see also American Baptist Churches
 v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 767-74 (N.D. Cal. 1989). See generally Schuck, supra note 6, at 59-62; Note,
 Extended Voluntary Departure: Limiting the Attorney General's Discretion in Immigration Matters, 85 MICH.
 L. REV. 152 (1986).
 345. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
 346. INA ? 101(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. ? ll0l(b)(1)(D) (1988), then provided that a "child" includes "an
 illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue
 of the relationship of the child to its natural mother." See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 797 (1977). Later, a 1986
 amendment included fathers with "a bona fide parent-child relationship." Immigration Reform and Control
 Act ? 315(a), Pub. L. No.99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified at INA ? 101(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. ? 1 101(b)(1)(D)
 (1988)).
 347. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-76 (1977) (legitimacy); Califano v. Webster, 430
 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (gender); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977) (gender); Craig v. Boren,
 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (legitimacy); Gomez v.
 Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (legitimacy).
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 Signs of change now appear on the horizon, in the form of expressly
 constitutional lower court decisions that have refused to accept the plenary
 power doctrine as controlling. While Fiallo clearly relied on the plenary power
 doctrine in rejecting the constitutional claim,348 the Court left the door slightly
 ajar for judicial review by characterizing the statute as "'largely immune from
 judicial control."'349 Lower courts have taken this statement, sometimes to-
 gether with Mandel's "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" test, to support
 limited judicial review using a rational basis test. A few lower courts have held
 immigration classifications to lack a rational basis and therefore to violate equal
 protection. For example, the Second Circuit held in Francis v. INS350 that,
 absent a rational basis, the BIA violated equal protection when it interpreted
 the statute to distinguish, for purposes of granting discretionary waivers,
 between permanent residents who had temporarily left the United States after
 becoming deportable and those who had not left.351
 In 1989, a district court in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
 v. Meese352 sustained a First Amendment challenge to several ideological
 deportation grounds as applied to two permanent residents and six nonimmi-
 grant aliens, based on their alleged affiliation with a Marxist group, the Popular
 Front for the Liberation of Palestine.353 The court reasoned that the provisions
 348. 430 U.S. at 799. See also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982) ("role of the judiciary
 is limited to determining whether the procedures meet the essential standard of fairness under the Due
 Process Clause and does not extend to imposing procedures that merely displace congressional choices of
 policy"). Interestingly, Fiallo cited Mandel more broadly, in support of the plenary power doctrine generally.
 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799.
 349. 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 210) (emphasis added); see also 430 U.S. at 793 n.5
 ("Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution even with respect
 to the power of the Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens."); id. at 795-96 n.6 ('This
 is not to say, as we make clear in n.5, supra, that the Government's power in this area is never subject to
 judicial review."). The lower court in Fiallo similarly reasoned that distinguishing between unwed mothers
 and fathers was neither "wholly devoid of any conceivable rational purpose" nor "fundamentally aimed at
 achieving a goal unrelated to the regulation of immigration." Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 166 (E.D.N.Y.
 1975), aff'd sub nom. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
 The plenary power cases in the early 1950's had hinted at some limited constitutional judicial review.
 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589-90 (1952) ("policy toward aliens" is "largely immune"
 from judicial review; issue is whether "congressional alarm" about "Communist conspiracy within the United
 States is either a fantasy or a pretense"). Harisiades rejected the view "that there were then or are now no
 possible grounds on which Congress might believe that Communists in our midst are inimical to our
 security." Id. at 590 (emphasis added); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544 (1952) ("no denial
 of . . . due process . . . where there is reasonable apprehension of hurt from aliens charged with a philosophy
 of violence against this Government").
 350. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976)
 351. Francis concerned interpretation of INA ? 212(c), 8 U.S.C. ? 1182(c) (1988). The Ninth Circuit
 followed Francis in Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1981). Cf. Immigration Assistance
 Project v. INS, 709 F. Supp. 998, 1002-03 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (equal protection violation because no
 rational basis for distinguishing between groups of legalization applicants); cf. Elias v. Department of State,
 721 F. Supp. 243, 247-50 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (no "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" to let citizen fa-
 thers, but not mothers, transmit citizenship to offspring born abroad).
 352. 714 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
 353. The deportation grounds at issue were INA ?? 241(a)(6)(D), (F)(iii), (G)(v), (H), 8 U.S.C.
 ?? 1251(a)(6)(D), (F)(iii), (G)(v), (H) (1988). 714 F. Supp. at 1062. The court did not reach plaintiffs'
 argument that sections 901(a) and (b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and
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 were unconstitutional because the same activities, if engaged in by citizens,
 would be protected by the First Amendment.?4 The court relied heavily on
 Chew and Justice Murphy's concurrence in Bridges,?55 and also cited Plyler
 v. Doe356 as authority in rejecting the government's argument that "a funda-
 mentally 'different' Bill of Rights applies to aliens seeking to avoid expulsion
 from the United States."357
 Harvard Law School Forum v. Shultz,358 a 1986 district court decision,
 took the "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" language, which Allende and
 El-Werfalli took from Mandel and applied to heighten subconstitutional judicial
 scrutiny, and reintroduced it at the constitutional level to recognize a First
 Amendment challenge of the sort that Mandel had rejected. The case concerned
 the government's refusal to let a member of the Palestine Liberation
 Organization's mission to the United Nations travel to Harvard to participate
 in a political forum. The analysis began by relying heavily on Allende359 but
 then moved quickly to the constitutional level. In reasoning that ran counter
 to Mandel, the court found that under the First Amendment the government's
 justification for refusing permission was "not facially legitimate because it is
 related to the suppression of protected political discussion."360
 Another recent case, Manwani v. INS,361 sustained substantive constitu-
 tional challenges to section five of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend-
 ments of 1986362 on the grounds that it imposes an impermissible irrebuttable
 presumption and violates equal protection.363 That section bars immigration
 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, ? 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399 (1987), were also unconstitutional.
 354. In reaching this conclusion, the court read Harisiades, which rejected a First Amendment
 challenge, as having applied the same First Amendment standard to aliens and citizens. The district court
 reasoned that First Amendment law had changed in the meantime, since the precedent cited by the
 Harisiades, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), had been superseded by later cases, most
 prominently Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See discussion of Harisiades supra note 68.
 355. 714 F. Supp. at 1074, 1076. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), is discussed supra text
 accompanying notes 109-16.
 356. 714 F. Supp. at 1075 n.l. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), is discussed supra text accompany-
 ing notes 196-99.
 357. 714 F. Supp. at 1079.
 358. 633 F. Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1986).
 359. Id. at 531.
 360. Id. at 531. cf. United States v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436, 1468-70 (9th Cir. 1989) (prosecuting
 sanctuary movement members for smuggling undocumented aliens does not abridge free exercise); American
 Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thomburgh, 718 F. Supp. 820, 822-23 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (IRCA employer sanctions
 do not abridge free exercise), appeal docketed, No. 89-56095 (9th Cir. 1989).
 361. 736 F. Supp. 1367 (W.D.N.C. 1990).
 362. Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (1986) (codified at INA ? 204(h), 8 U.S.C. ? 1154 (h) and
 INA ? 245(e), 8 U.S.C. ? 1255(e) (1988)).
 363. 736 F. Supp. at 1386-92. The district court also found violations of procedural due process rights.
 Id. at 1383-86. In contrast, a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit relied on characterizing the statute
 as violating procedural due process because it delayed for two years an affected couple's opportunity to
 prove their marriage bona fide. See Escobar v. INS, 896 F.2d 564, 567-73 (D.C. Cir. 1990), rev'g 700
 F. Supp. 609, 611-13 (D.D.C. 1988), withdrawn and reh'g en banc granted (Apr. 25, 1990). The Supreme
 Court rejected a similar argument in Fiallo v. Bell. See 430 U.S. 787, 791 (1977). The reasoning in Escobar
 illustrates an interesting variation on phantom norm decisionmaking. Rather than give a statute a particular
 interpretation, it casts the statute as "procedural," which makes the constitutional challenge more likely to
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 based on a marriage entered into while deportation proceedings are pending,
 unless the alien first leaves the country for two years.36M Both Yick Wo pro-
 geny-Wong Wing, Russian Volunteer Fleet, Mathews v. Diaz, and Plyler v.
 Doe-and phantom norm decisions-Chew and Wong Yang Sung-figured
 centrally in the district court's reasoning.365 This pattern-reliance upon both
 phantom norm decisions and the line of cases from Yick Wo to Plyler-is likely
 to be the reasoning in other decisions undermining or limiting the plenary
 power doctrine, just as it was, for example, in Justice Douglas' dissent in
 Harisiades366 and Justice Marshall's dissent in Jean.367
 These recent cases notwithstanding, the key Supreme Court constitutional
 precedents-Knauff, Mezei, and Harisiades being the most prominent among
 them-still severely limit judicial review. Almost always, substantive rules
 made directly by Congress have withstood constitutional challenge.368 The
 Court may someday disavow the plenary power doctrine, but that step will take
 time. In the meantime, however, courts will continue to avoid this directly
 applicable constitutional doctrine through subconstitutional decisions that rely
 on phantom constitutional norms much more favorable to aliens. Cases that
 purport to speak only subconstitutionally have become the indirect expression
 of an alternative body of constitutional immigration law in which the plenary
 succeed.
 364. INA ? 204(h), 8 U.S.C. ? 1154(h) (1988).
 365. Manwani, 736 F. Supp. at 1375-76, 1382-83, 1388-90.
 366. 342 U.S. 580, 598-99 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Yick Wo, Wong Wing, Russian Volunteer
 Fleet, and other cases).
 367. 472 U.S.846,872-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Chew, Wong Wing,Russian VolunteerFleet,
 and Yick Wo). Cf. Note, The Constitutional Rights of Excludable Aliens: History Provides a Refuge, 61
 WASH. L. REV. 1449 (1986) (proposing analytical framework based on Wong Wing and Yamataya to replace
 plenary power doctrine). Jean is discussed in greater detail supra text accompanying notes 237-55.
 368. See, e.g., Newton v. INS, 736 F.2d 336,339-42 (6th Cir. 1984) (excluding exchange visitors from
 eligibility for suspension of deportation); Nademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811, 814-15 (10th Cir. 1982) (treating
 Iranians differently after taking of Tehran hostages), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 872 (1982); Sadegh-Nobari v.
 INS, 676 F.2d 1348, 1351 (10th Cir. 1982) (same); Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir.
 1981) (same); United States v. Barajas-Guillen, 632 F.2d 749, 752-54 (9th Cir. 1980) (voluntary departure
 rules tending to exclude indigent aliens); Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747-48 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
 denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980) (classifying aliens by nationality); Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d 1028, 1034 (9th
 Cir. 1979) (treating fiances and spouses of United States citizens differently in inquiring into bona fides
 of marriage); Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459, 467 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying different readings of INA
 section in different circuits); Alvarez v. District Director, 539 F.2d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 1976) (limiting
 special treatment of "commuter aliens" to aliens from contiguous countries); Guan Chow Tok v. INS, 538
 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1976) (deporting narcotics offenders); Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1028-29 (2d
 Cir. 1975) (different extended voluntary departure rules for spouse of citizens and of permanent residents);
 Dunn v. INS, 499 F.2d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1974) (distinguishing Eastern and Western Hemisphere aliens
 for relief from deportation), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1016 (1975).
 Other recent cases have upheld the constitutionality of ? 5 of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend-
 ments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537. See Almario v. Attorney Gen., 872 F.2d 147, 151 (6th
 Cir. 1989) ("Kleindienst and Fiallo require that we exercise a very narrow standard of review assuming
 the classification at issue in this case is supported by a facially legitimate and bona fide reason"; purpose
 is to deter marriage fraud); see also Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1990), affg 719 F. Supp.
 86, 89-96 (D. Conn. 1989); Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d 1218, 1221-24 (5th Cir. 1989), aff'g 685 F. Supp.
 599 (E.D. La. 1988); Minatsis v. Brown, 713 F. Supp. 1056, 1060-61 (S.D. Ohio 1989); Smith v. INS, 684
 F. Supp. 1113, 1116-20 (D. Mass. 1988).
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 power doctrine has lost much of its force. From this broader perspective, the
 practical demise of the plenary power doctrine seems closer in time.369
 One basic problem that arises in this situation is that it is difficult accurately
 to identify and distinguish between constitutional and subconstitutional immi-
 gration law. Was Woodby a constitutional or subconstitutional decision? What
 about Jean? What are the limits of Congress' power to legislate different results
 in those situations? A related point is that the alternative body of phantom
 constitutional norms is relatively inaccessible. Litigants and judges know, in
 a loose way, about the gradual erosion of plenary power, but they generally do
 not distinguish between directly applied constitutional law and the alternative
 body of phantom norm decisions. Inaccessibility in turn limits the range of
 litigants' arguments and judges' decisions.
 The inaccessibility problem forms part of a much larger and more funda-
 mental difficulty. If the constitutional norms that courts use to interpret statutes
 to avoid constitutional doubt are phantoms, then those norms may not guide,
 but may misguide. In fact, the phantom norms actually turn on its head the
 practice of interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional doubt. If we heed the
 plenary power doctrine, there is no real doubt to be avoided, but courts, perhaps
 hearing the echo of Yick Wo, nonetheless assume the existence of a constitution-
 al question and answer it by relying on a phantom norm. Concerns for legisla-
 tive supremacy, which arise whenever courts bend statutes by relying on a
 constitutional norm,370 are even greater when the norm is a phantom.371 In
 this sense, mainstream public law decisions that avoid constitutional issues only
 by severely straining the statutory text372 may be more defensible than Chew
 or Fleuti, because those mainstream decisions at least respond to real constitu-
 tional norms. After the gradual enhancement of the constitutional status of
 permanent residents, and especially after Plasencia, we can look back and
 believe that Chew was "correctly" decided. But for other norms that have yet
 to become "real," for instance in the four currently important areas of immigra-
 tion law discussed in Part III.B, we lack the comfort of hindsight, and the
 problem of misguided statutory interpretation looms large.
 369. Cf. Legomsky, supra note 5, at 303 ("We have entered a new phase in the life of the plenary
 power doctrine. This stage is characterized by a judicial willingness, so far episodic, to cut away at the
 notion of plenary Congressional power over immigration."); id. at 305 ("Constitutional review of immigra-
 tion legislation will enter another, perhaps final, stage. This next stage will be marked by a return to general
 principles of constitutional law. It will be unnecessary for courts to distinguish immigration statutes from
 other federal statutes."); Schuck, supra note 6, at 34 ("Capitulation seems only a matter of time for some
 of these doctrines, while for others the outcome remains highly uncertain."); id. at 58 (increasing willingness
 of courts to review immigration decisions "essentially remains a lower court phenomenon").
 370. See Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1065-73.
 371. Thus, Judge Posner's critical observation that the canon leads to overenforcement of constitutional
 norms, see R. POSNER, supra note 75, at 285, has greater merit when directed toward immigration law's
 phantom norm decisions, even if, as Sunstein argues, Posner is incorrect as to constitutional law generally
 because those norms are real even though underenforced. See Sunstein, supra note 77, at 469.
 372. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), discussed in Eskridge, supra note 74,
 at 1022, 1066.
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 One defense of phantom norm decisions is that they have been a useful
 testing ground for new constitutional ideas without the need to challenge
 prevailing doctrine. What began subconstitutionally-first with Chew, then
 Fleuti-may lead ultimately to an expressly constitutional change such as in
 Plasencia-as phantom subconstitutional decisions undermine the existing
 constitutional structure to the point that it topples.373 As I suggested in the
 Introduction, this process may be a healthy, perhaps preferred, and perhaps even
 inevitable form of constitutional change. Still, this pattern has taken an extreme
 form in immigration law. What seems aberrant is the persistence, beyond any
 reasonable definition of "transitional phase," of real, plenary power-based
 constitutional norms in immigration law, as well as the degree of conflict
 between them and the phantom norms from the Yick Wo tradition that guide
 statutory interpretation.
 As a result, phantom constitutional norms and directly applicable constitu-
 tional immigration law provide little by way of dialogue en route to new consti-
 tutional doctrine. Instead, the tension between the plenary power doctrine and
 subconstitutional phantom norm decisions has caused considerable damage to
 the process of dialogue about the future of immigration law. Each body of
 constitutional immigration law has its adherents. Government briefs in immi-
 gration cases rely heavily on directly applicable constitutional immigration law,
 while advocates for aliens cite the subconstitutional phantom norm decisions.
 Each of these two groups of cases seems determined to speak in a louder voice,
 each hoping to drown out the other, but there is no conversation. This absence
 of dialogue is what convinces me that immigration law is an extreme case,
 where phantom norm decisionmaking has lingered beyond a period of honest,
 tentative groping and experimentation and into a phase in which it has become
 mere technique and perhaps even subterfuge.374
 In spite of these many problems, any overall assessment of phantom norm
 decisionmaking should reflect a more basic ambivalence. It oversimplifies the
 history to identify only the problems and, with the acuity of hindsight, say that
 these judges were just renegades who disliked the prevailing constitutional
 373. Cf. L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967) (legal fictions are ephemeral building blocks of legal
 communication, to be discarded when no longer useful).
 374. See generally G. CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 178-81 (1982). In
 the short run, any movement away from phantom norm decisionmaking and toward more direct dialogue
 may deprive aliens of a strategy of argumentation that has helped them in many of the cases discussed in
 this Article. Certainly in the lower courts, judicial candor about the exact nature of the constitutional norms
 that inform interpretation of statutes may briefly strengthen the precedential force of the key plenary power
 cases such as Mezei, Knauff, and Harisiades. For a while, then, aliens may lose a few more immigration
 cases than before. But I believe that this movement will hasten the complete demise of the plenary power
 doctrine for two reasons. First, the case for abandoning the doctrine will become more compelling because
 courts no longer will be able to rely on the mechanism-phantom norm decisionmaking-through which
 they effectively have accomplished a partial integration of immigration law into mainstream public law.
 And second, when the extent of that integration becomes more widely known, express application of
 mainstream public law norms in immigration cases will seem less radical, and indeed sometimes consistent
 with precedent. In the long run, the end of plenary power should be worth the interim price.
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 immigration law and acted lawlessly in smuggling in constitutional rules more
 to their liking. Phantom norm decisions have been an understandable and
 perhaps even noble response by conscientious judges to the perceived anachro-
 nistic character of plenary power. We have these decisions to thank for the fact
 that the Constitution is not as far removed from immigration law as the plenary
 power doctrine would suggest. These decisions have been the only means by
 which immigration law has moved beyond the nineteenth-century world of
 classical immigration law and come to reflect, in some small part, the values,
 embodied in the Yick Wo tradition, that are more consistent with our modern
 sense of justice. The dissonance between immigration law and our mainstream
 public law has made some judges feel that they must find a way to harmonize
 the two. Some of those judges have been Justices of the Supreme Court of the
 United States, as Chew, Jean, and other cases amply demonstrate. They, like
 lower court judges, have felt constrained by precedent to render decisions that
 give them some considerable discomfort, but not enough discomfort to prompt
 the immediate creation of a new constitutional immigration law.
 To move confidently into the second century of immigration law, we need
 to understand what went wrong in the first century. The development of a
 subconstitutional case law based on phantom constitutional norms is persuasive
 evidence that as long as judges have discretion to decide cases, no area of law,
 not even immigration law, can hope to insulate itself forever from the rest of
 our legal culture. This was the vain hope, and ultimately the failure, of the
 plenary power doctrine.
 The future of immigration law requires considerable thought and discussion.
 To what extent should the analytical framework that applies in the mainstream
 of our public law apply to immigration cases? To what extent should the
 answers be the same or different because immigration is at issue? And ultimate-
 ly, who are "we" as a community, and what do we demand of those who want
 to join? The most fundamental problem with the plenary power doctrine is that
 it has seriously impaired the process of dialogue on these questions, whatever
 the best answers may be. We will begin to restore dialogue only when courts,
 including the Supreme Court in cases like Jean v. Nelson, take the next step
 and begin to put their constitutional thinking in expressly constitutional terms.
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